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1 See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1998);  Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, § 2.
3 See CIANA, H.R. 748, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (adopted by the House on April 27, 2005); Child
Custody Protection Act ( CCPA), S. 403, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 2 (adopted by the Senate on July 25, 2006).
CIANA is a broader measure than CCPA, in that separately mandates parental notice and a minimum 24 hour
delay for minor abortions regardless of whether the minor’s home state or the state in which the abortion is
sought impose such requirements.  See infra notes 257–258.  To avoid confusion and because it raises some
additional constitutional concerns, the discussion here references CIANA only, but the substance of CIANA’s
INTRODUCTION
Consider three potential federal statutes:
• Congress authorizes states to refuse to recognize
laws and judgments of other states that relate to
same-sex marriage.
• Congress authorizes states to impose residency
requirements as a condition of engaging in certain
economic activities within a state, such as the
provision of legal services.
• Congress imposes civil and criminal penalties on
anyone who knowingly assists a minor to obtain
an out-of-state abortion without complying with
the parental notification requirements of the state
in which she resides.
Each of these statutes authorizes interstate discrimination in some form.   Moreover,
absent such authorization, each of these forms of interstate discrimination is of
dubious constitutionality.   Indeed, under current caselaw state legislation refusing
to recognize other states’ judgments or requiring residency as a condition of
occupational licensure plainly contravene Article IV of the U.S. Constitution.1
Collectively, therefore, these measures raise the question of the scope of
congressional power with respect to interstate relations in general, and Article IV in
particular.  
That question is of increasing practical importance.  Conjuring up these
statutes requires no great feat of legal imagination.  The first, of course, is already
enacted law, in the form of Section 2 of the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA).2 The third may soon become law; it mirrors Section 2 of the Child
Interstate Abortion Notification Act (CIANA), which the House passed last year and
which the Senate recently adopted in the form of the Child Custody Protection Act.3
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Section 2 and the CCPA are identical.
4 Solid Waste Empowerment and Enforcement Act of 2005, H.R. 70, 109th Cong., 1st Sess.
(authorizing states to impose limits on importation of solid waste from other states); Economic Development Act
of 2005, S. 1066, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (authorizing states to provide tax incentives for the purposes of
economic development provided, among other requirements, that the availability of the tax incentive does not
depend on state of incorporation, commercial domicile, or residence).
5 Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 378–79 (1978).
6 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180–81 (1869) (addressing Article IV’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause); see also Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) ( “The animating purpose
of the full faith and credit command . . . “was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others,
and to make them integral parts of a single nation.’”) (quoting  Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S.
268, 277 (1935)).
7 U.S. Const., art. I,  8, cl. 3.  I do not discuss here the use of the spending power.
Only the second is (for now) purely hypothetical.  However, similar measures
authorizing interstate economic discrimination—such as proposals to allow states to
grant discriminatory tax incentives to foster in-state economic activity or to ban
importation of other states’ waste—are currently pending in Congress.4
The scope of congressional authority over interstate relations is also
important on a more conceptual level, both in clarifying the role of Article IV in our
constitutional structure and in delineating the respective responsibilities of Congress
and the courts in horizontal federalism disputes.  Federalism is most commonly
envisioned as addressing federal-state relationships, what is sometimes called the
“vertical” dimension of federalism.   But any system of government based on a union
of otherwise “sovereign” entities must also address the relationship among those
entities.  The resultant rules and doctrines governing interstate relationships are the
“horizontal” dimension of federalism.
Article IV is one of the least familiar components of the original Constitution,
but it is central to our horizontal federalism framework.  Indeed, the article is in
many ways the backbone of national union.  Known as the states’ relations article,5
its principal provisions limit the states’ ability to discriminate against one
another—whether by not respecting sister state judgments, laws, and criminal
proceedings, or by denying out-of-state residents the right to engage in economic and
other activity within the state.  In the words of the Supreme Court, without such
prohibitions “the Republic would have constituted little more than a league of States;
it would not have constituted the Union which now exists.”6  These prohibitions are
phrased absolutely and, given their importance to securing union, would seem to
allow no exceptions.
Yet Article IV’s antidiscrimination prescriptions are only one side of the
constitutional equation when it comes to union; the other consists of Congress’
powers to regulate interstate relations.  Article I’s Commerce Clause grants Congress
affirmative power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,”7 from
which the courts have inferred a prohibition on state discrimination against interstate
commerce.  This prohibition, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, represents
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8 See infra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.  The most prominent examples of such
congressionally-sanctioned discrimination are:  the McCarran-Ferguson Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015;
the Bank Holding Company Act, originally codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) but since repealed; Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 2021e; Webb-Kenyon Act, codified at 27
U.S.C. § 122; Wilson Act, codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121.  But see Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005)
(holding that the Wilson Act, now embodied in the 21st Amendment, did not extend to authorizing state liquor
regulation that discriminated against interstate commerce).
9 For example, after setting out the requirement that states must provide full faith and credit to the acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of other states, Article IV proceeds to grant Congress power to declare the
effect that such out-of-state measures will have, without expressly subjecting Congress to the full faith demand.
See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.  Similarly, Article IV’s New State Clause authorizes Congress to admit new states
to the union but says nothing express about the powers new states must enjoy or their relationships to existing
states, other than protecting existing states from being divided or combined against their will.  Id., § 3.
10 The scholarly commentary on DOMA’s constitutionality is too extensive to be cited in full.  Some
of the thoughtful contributions are:  Paige E. Chabora, Congress’ Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 Neb. L. Rev.604 (1997); Stanley E. Cox, Nine Questions About
Same-Sex Marriage Conflicts, 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 361, 400–08 (2006); Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and
DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 21 (1997)[hereinafter
Koppelman, DOMA]; Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 Yale L. J. 1965 (1997); Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?)
Unconstitutional, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 915 (2006) [hereinafter Rosen, DOMA] ; Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence
Across State Lines: The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of
Protection Orders, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 827 (2004);  Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On
DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 307 (1998);  Lynn D.
Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the Constitution, 38 Creighton
L. Rev. 365 (2005); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
Defense of Marriage Act, 32 Creighton L. Rev. 255 (1998).
another core horizontal federalism postulate, and indeed where economic activity of
nonresident individuals is involved, the demands of the dormant Commerce Clause
and Article IV largely overlap.  Notably, nearly a century and a half of precedent
holds that Congress can authorize states to engage in interstate economic
discrimination that, absent such congressional approval, would violate the dormant
Commerce Clause.8  In like vein, Article I’s Section 10 expressly grants Congress
power to sanction certain otherwise prohibited forms of state action.  Even Article
IV itself speaks in two voices.  At the same time as it prohibits state discrimination
in absolute terms, Article IV also grants Congress broad control over aspects of
interstate relations without expressly subjecting Congress itself to equivalent
antidiscrimination requirements.9
Squaring these two constitutional features—Article IV’s prohibitions and
Congress’ power to structure interstate relations—requires developing a
comprehensive account of the scope of congressional authority in the interstate
arena.  Such an account, however,  is currently lacking; indeed, the challenges and
dilemmas of horizontal federalism have been generally underappreciated in
American constitutional scholarship.  Not surprisingly, therefore, enactment of
DOMA has triggered a flurry of writing on Article IV’s Effects Clause, which grants
Congress authority to determine the effect that one state’s laws and judgments will
have in another.10  But overwhelmingly, this commentary treats that topic in
isolation, without seeking to develop an integrated understanding of Congress’
power with regard to Article IV as a whole.  Substantial commentary also exists
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11 For nearly sixty years, the leading article on Congress’ power to authorize dormant Commerce
Clause violations has been Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 Colum.
L. Rev. 547 (1947); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Foreword—Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975) (discussing this congressional power as a form of constitutional
common law).  Norman Williams recently authored a sustained critique of Congress’ ability to authorize dormant
Commerce Clause violations, but he does not analyze whether Congress can sanction state violations of the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause and instead presumes that it cannot.  See Norman Williams, Why
Congress May Not “Overrule” The Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 153 (2005). 
12 Two efforts to take a more comprehensive view of Congress’ powers over interstate relations and
Article IV are Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law § 6-35 (3rd ed. 2000) [hereinafter Tribe,
Treatise], and William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten
Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 395–96, 399–400 (1982) (hereinafter Cohen, Enigma).   In
addition, Douglas Laycock offers an integrated analysis of Article IV’s Full Faith and Credit and Privileges and
Immunities Clauses, although not addressing Congress’ powers under these provisions. See Douglas Laycock,
Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L.
Rev. 249, 270–73 (1992); see also Jonathan Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev.
487, 570–71 (1981) (discussing Congress’ power over the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and its relationship
to Congress’ power to authorize interstate economic discrimination in the course of a broader exposition of the
Clause’s import).  
13 Tribe, Treatise, supra note 12, at 1243; see infra sources cited note 130.
14 See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n. 18 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(“While Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure of faith and credit that a State must accord to
the laws or judgments of another State, there is at least some question whether Congress may cut back on the
measure of faith and credit required by a decision of this Court.”); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr.
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 215 n. 1 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (noting that the Court
had “no occasion to determine whether Congress may authorize . . . what otherwise would be a violation of th[e
Privileges and Immunities] Clause” and stating that the “question may present considerations different from .
. .the dormant Commerce Clause”). 
assessing the dormant Commerce Clause’s limits on interstate economic
discrimination.  Only occasionally, however, does this scholarship engage the
question of Congress’ power to authorize violations of the dormant Commerce
Clause,11 or how that power relates to congressional authority under Article IV.12
Serious analysis of Congress’ power to authorize relaxation of Article IV’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause is particularly rare, although the dominant
presumption, expressed best by Laurence Tribe, is that the Clause “confers a
personal right against state action discriminating against out-of-staters, whether or
not such discrimination has purportedly been endorsed by Congress.”13
Nor has the Court provided much guidance on these issues.  Despite the
mountain of federalism precedent accumulated in the over two hundred years since
the Constitution’s adoption, the Court has scarcely addressed the question of
Congress’ powers in the interstate context.  It has never ruled, for example, on
whether Congress can contract the antidiscrimination obligations that courts have
read Article IV as imposing on the states.14  Moreover, when the Court has addressed
such questions—as, for example, in decisions sustaining Congress’ power to
authorize state burdens on interstate commerce—it has provided little clarification
of the proper bounds of Congress’ role, and none at all with respect to the seeming
conflict between the upheld congressional authority and Article IV’s protections
against discrimination.  The Court’s relative silence on Congress’ role in horizontal
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15 See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding
Massachusetts’ prohibition on same-sex marriage violates the state’s constitution).  In Vermont, a similar state
supreme court determination has led to a state law authorizing same-sex civil unions.  See Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  For a list of challenges currently pending in numerous state courts alleging that statutory
p r o h i b i t i o n s  o n  s a m e - s e x  m a r r i a g e  v i o l a t e  s t a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s ,  s e e
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/record2?record=9 (last visited March 9, 2006).
16 Challenges to the constitutionality of DOMA’s section 2 have been rejected by lower federal courts,
although no such litigation is currently pending.   See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp.2d 1298, 1303–04 (M.D.
Fla. 2005); see also Smelt v. County of Orange, 2006 WL 1194825 at *6 (9th Cir. May 5, 2006) (No. 05-56040)
(affirming district court’s ruling that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of DOMA’s
Section 2).  In addition, however, legislation is currently pending in Congress to deny federal court jurisdiction
over questions arising under the DOMA.  See Marriage Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. § 2
(2005). 
17 The same principle would apply to other individual rights amendments that bind the states.  The
discussion here references only the Fourteenth Amendment because that amendment is most salient to the
interstate context; in addition, by their terms other amendments apply to Congress as well as the states, and thus
Congress’ inability to authorize state violations of their requirements is more evident.
federalism may, however, soon change.  With Massachusetts’ recent recognition of
same-sex marriage,15 the issue of whether DOMA’s Section 2 exceeded Congress’
powers may well come before the Supreme Court in the near future.16  
The time is thus ripe for a sustained examination of Congress’ power over
interstate relations, and this article aims to undertake that task.  I conclude, first, that
the Constitution grants Congress expansive authority to structure interstate
relationships.  This authority derives from both Article I and Article IV, although the
latter source has independent determinative significance only regarding the relatively
narrow category of interstate activity that falls outside Congress’ Article I powers.
Second, contrary to Professor Tribe and others, in wielding this interstate authority
Congress is not limited by judicial interpretations of Article IV. In my view,
subjecting Congress to Article IV’s antidiscrimination restrictions unjustifiably limits
Congress’ interstate authority and ignores Congress’ unique institutional position and
capacities as the national representative body.  In general, Congress should be able
to authorize interstate discrimination when it plausibly concludes that such
discrimination serves the national interest, and its enactments in this regard should
not be subject to greater scrutiny than the lenient rationality review that ordinarily
applies to congressional commerce power legislation.
Thus, rather than constituting the unalterable demands of union, the
antidiscrimination provisions of Article IV are, like the dormant Commerce Clause,
best understood as constitutional default rules.  These provisions are judicially
enforceable against the states, but their enforceability is contingent on the absence
of congressionally-authorized discrimination.  This does not mean that Congress is
wholly free to reset the bounds of acceptable state behavior in interstate contexts.
On the contrary, Congress is constitutionally constrained; however, the relevant
limits do not derive from Article IV or principles of federalism.  They derive instead
from the Fourteenth Amendment:  Congress cannot authorize states to violate
interstate prohibitions that are independently protected by that provision.17
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18 Charles Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 7 (1969). 
19 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (inferring prohibition on Congress
commandeering states to implement federal regulatory programs from, inter alia, the Constitution’s diverse grants
of protection to state governments and the principle of limited national powers combined with the Tenth
Amendment); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (declaring, in the Eleventh
Amendment context, that “[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and
control”).
20 This article is not the occasion for, and it does not require, a full-dress justification of my views on
constitutional interpretation.  But some precatory comments orienting this article against the background of
constitutional scholarship seem in order.  As the methodological description above suggests, I am fairly
“conventionalist” in my approach to constitutional interpretation, in that I believe it is necessary to take seriously
insights offered by the variety of standard sources of constitutional interpretation.  See Thomas W. Merrill,
Toward A Principled Interpretation of the Commerce Clause 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 31, 32–33 (1998); see
also Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 11-12 (1991) (identifying standard sources of constitutional
interpretation).  In any event, given its relative obscurity in constitutional scholarship, consideration of Article
IV’s full background is merited, whatever one’s view of the proper metes and bounds of constitutional analysis.
My analysis here focuses primarily upon extrapolating the constitutional
“structures and relationships”18 that govern the division of power between the
different levels and branches of government in horizontal federalism contexts.  Such
a structural focus is a staple of federalism jurisprudence and scholarship, in part
because the proper boundaries of federal and state power are often difficult to discern
from constitutional text alone.19  The need to look beyond text is equally true here,
despite Article IV’s seeming facial clarity, because limning the proper reach of
congressional power over interstate relationships necessitates integrating Article IV
with Article I.  Nonetheless, my argument pays close attention to constitutional text,
both to discern what limitations are imposed on Congress in the interstate arena and
for more general insights regarding Congress’ structural role.  It also places great
weight on precedent in analyzing the scope of congressional authority, as well as
considers historical evidence on how the framers and subsequent generations
understood Congress’ interstate role.20 
Less emphasis is put on justifying the scope of Congress’ power from a more
strictly normative or policy perspective.  To some, this might seem a significant
omission, since strong normative and policy arguments could be leveled against
granting Congress broad power essentially to revise the Constitution’s interstate
antidiscrimination requirements.  Congressionally-authorized state discrimination
may undermine national economic growth, by encouraging state barriers to free
trade; it also seems likely to lead to multiple and potentially conflicting systems of
state regulation, with inefficiencies an inevitable result.  In addition, the examples
of DOMA and CIANA raise concerns that Congress will exploit its interstate powers
to advance a restrictive social agenda in areas otherwise thought outside its purview,
at the cost of individual liberty.
I share many of these concerns.  But I believe that these policy and normative
arguments are largely for Congress, not the courts.  Fears that Congress will misuse
its powers cannot legitimately trump the structural, textual, and precedential
evidence for recognizing Congress broad authority over interstate relations.  Thus,
to my mind such policy and normative arguments are relevant only to the extent they
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provide evidence on whether granting Congress a revisory power over interstate
relations accords with the system of government that the Constitution created.  In this
regard, caution is needed before condemning congressional authority to sanction
interstate discrimination as inherently at odds with the Constitution’s commitment
to national union.  Viewed functionally, the demands of national union have no
preset, acontextual content.  What is needed to ensure union at the outset of a fragile
federation or in situations when norms and rules of national attachment are weak
may not be what is needed when  national identity and ties are strong.  Most
importantly, Congress institutionally is best positioned to determine whether
instances of interstate discrimination ultimately accrue to the national interest.  
The article begins in Part I with the structural arguments for broad
congressional power over Article IV and interstate relations.  Several central features
of the interstate relations context—the need for a federal umpire; the Constitution’s
emphasis on congressional supervision in a variety of interstate relations contexts;
differences between vertical and horizontal federalism regarding the danger of
congressional self-dealing; and institutional competency concerns—support
recognizing such expansive congressional authority.  Part I then turns to an
examination of counterarguments, which focus on constitutional text and Article IV’s
history.  It contends that none of these counterarguments supports denying Congress
the preeminent regulatory role when it comes to ordering interstate relations,
including the power to authorize state conduct that otherwise would violate Article
IV.  
One core theme that emerges from Part I is the importance of examining
Article IV’s provisions against both the background of Article I and of Article IV as
a whole.  Article IV is not often considered as a single entity; understandably so,
given that its four sections were cobbled together during the last minutes of the
constitutional convention. Moreover, the article’s core interstate prohibitions—the
Full Faith and Credit, Privileges and Immunities, and Extradition Clauses—are
located in its first two sections, whereas the latter half of the article (comprising the
New State, Territory and Property, and Guarantee Clauses) is facially more focused
on state-federal relations.  Yet these last sections also contain an interstate
dimension, and they are notable in the extent to which they address potential sources
of interstate conflict by granting power to Congress.  Viewing Article IV as a whole,
and particularly in conjunction with the Commerce Clause, significantly clarifies
Congress’ central role in interstate relations.  Doing so, however, also dissolves
Article IV’s seeming textual clarity and complicates any historical case for viewing
its requirements as absolute. 
Part II takes up the question of what limits, if any, the Constitution imposes
on Congress’ power to structure interstate relations.  It begins by examining the
constraints imposed by state sovereignty.  Viewing Article IV as a whole is also
helpful here, as its latter sections suggest core federalism postulates—such as state
autonomy, state equality, and state territoriality—to which any account of Congress’
powers over the initial, more overtly interstate provisions of the article must adhere.
But careful investigation demonstrates that these federalism postulates have little
cabining effect on Congress in its structuring of interstate relations; they preclude
only extreme measures that Congress is exceedingly unlikely to enact.  Instead, the
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real limit on Congress comes not from Article IV or federalism at all, but from the
Fourteenth Amendment.  In regulating interstate relations, Congress cannot authorize
states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibitions.   
This Fourteenth Amendment restriction on Congress’ interstate relations
authority necessitates a nuanced assessment of Article IV’s interstate requirements,
to discern which requirements receive independent protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment and which instead are fundamentally interstate relations measures
subject to congressional control.  Part III undertakes this inquiry, using an analysis
of the interstate provisions of DOMA and CIANA as a prism through which to assess
the scope of Congress’ power over Article IV.  It concludes that both measures fall
within Congress’ powers over interstate relations.  Nonrecognition of judgments
potentially could violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections of property.  But
given the difficulty in proving justified reliance, DOMA’s authorization for
nonrecognition of judgments involving same-sex marriages seems unlikely to fall on
this ground.   Insofar as CIANA relates to states’ regulation of their own residents,
they arguably present no Article IV issue at all, and Congress should have power to
authorize states to impose residency requirements as a condition for engaging in
ordinary economic activity, notwithstanding the restriction of the Article IV right to
travel that would result.  The forms of the right to travel at issue in these
measures—freedom to take advantage of lawful activities in other states and to
exercise constitutionally-protected freedoms without regard to state of
residence—are aspects of individual liberty and national citizenship in a federated
union that generally qualify for stronger Fourteenth Amendment.  Nonetheless,
recognition of a state’s special relationship to its minors may well suffice to render
Section 2 of CIANA itself constitutional. 
I.  THE STRUCTURAL DEMANDS OF UNION: THE CASE FOR BROAD
CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER INTERSTATE RELATIONSHIPS
A structural account of the demands of union establishes both the need for a
federal umpire and the Constitution’s allocation of this role primarily to Congress.
This part begins by setting out the affirmative case for an expansive congressional
power over interstate relations, including the power to expand or contract Article
IV’s prohibitions on state discrimination.   It argues that the constitutional model for
interstate relations—evident in the dormant Commerce Clause context and also in
regard to Article IV—consists of judicially-enforced antidiscrimination norms that
are subject to congressional override.  This model reflects structural differences
between horizontal and vertical federalism.  While not absent, fears of congressional
self-dealing at the expense of the states and constitutional federalism principles are
substantially mitigated in the horizontal federalism context.  Congressional primacy
also accords with institutional competency.  Congress has a comparative advantage
over the courts in both discerning state discrimination and determining when such
discrimination is justified.  This part then turns to assessing, and ultimately rejecting,
arguments for a more limited congressional role based on Article IV’s text and
history.
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21 U.S. Const., art. III, para. 1.
22 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 346-47 (1816).
23 Federalist 80 (Hamilton), The Federalist Papers 478 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
24 See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 91949); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419, 445–46 (1827); Thomas R. Colby, Revitalizing The Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the
Commerce Power, 91 Va. L. Rev. 249, 266–84 (2005); Richard B. Collins, Economic Union As a Constitutional
Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 43, 52–57 (1988). For a discussion of scholarship questioning whether the extent of
such discrimination was as great as the framers claimed, see Collins, supra, at 57–58. 
25 See Julian Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L. J. 425, 429–35 (1981).
26 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199– 209 (1824); see also id. at 227 (Johnson, J. concurring in the judgment)
(adopting the exclusive view of the commerce power).
A. Structural Arguments for Congress’ Role As Interstate Umpire
 
Some national umpire over interstate relations is essential for ensuring union.
The alternative is to have the states themselves, either through their political
branches or their courts, determine when they have transgressed the Constitution’s
interstate demands.  Granting the states alone such power creates obvious dangers
of bias and retaliation, as the history of interstate discrimination under the Articles
of Confederation made clear.  The grant of alienage and diversity jurisdiction to the
federal courts, as well as jurisdiction over disputes between two or more states,21
confirms the framers’ recognition of the need for a federal arbiter of interstate
disputes.22  In Federalist No. 80, Hamilton notably linked the grant of diversity
jurisdiction to Article IV, arguing that diversity jurisdiction was needed to ensure
“the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which
the citizens of the Union will be entitled.”23 
Thus, the ultimate question is not whether the federal government should
have power to mediate interstate relations; it does.  Nor is it whether both Congress
and the Court are authorized to play this umpiring role; both are.  Instead, the real
question is which of these two branches of federal government should exercise
primary control over interstate relations.  In general, I submit, the Constitution
assigns the primary role of interstate umpire to Congress.   
1. Congressional Power to Authorize State Violations of the Dormant
Commerce Clause. The grant of the commerce power is particularly instructive on
congressional primacy in ordering interstate relations.  Discriminatory state
commercial regulation and resultant state retaliation formed a key part of the impetus
behind the constitutional convention.24  Even so, the Constitution granted only
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, with limited prohibitions on its
ability to discriminate among states.25  Of course, the Commerce Clause could have
been read as granting Congress exclusive control of interstate commerce, and thus
as excluding state regulation in this area altogether.  Indeed, Gibbons v. Ogden, an
early landmark, indicated sympathy for this view.26  Ultimately, however, Gibbons
itself rested on the Court’s conclusion that the New York statute at issue was
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27 See id. at 210–221.
28 See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 318 (1851) (arguing that Congress’ commerce power
is only exclusive regarding matters of a nature that require uniform regulations); Mayor of New York v. Miln,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 132 (1837) (upholding New York statute requiring master of a vessel to report names and
residences of passengers as a police regulation); see generally Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Power Under
Marshall, Taney, and Waite (1937). 
29 See, e.g., American Trucking Ass’ns v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2005).
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), embodies the modern statement of the doctrine.
30 For recent reiterations of this rule, see, e.g., Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171(1992); see also Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1990–02
(2005) (discussing pre-Prohibition congressional acts authorizing state regulation of alcohol to determine if the
acts authorized state discrimination against out-of-state alcohol).
31 See 53 U.S. at 319–20.  Cooley is one step short of the current formula because the Court did not
give conclusive effect to the federal statute.
32 59 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1855) (emphasizing that its prior decision turned on its determination that
obstructing navigation of the Ohio river conflicted with prior acts of Congress, which were superseded by the
new legislation); see also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 569, 578 (1851).
33 In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 560–63 (1891); see also Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109–10 (1890)
(holding Iowa lacked power to ban sale of imported liquor that remained in its original package, but signaling
that congress could authorize such state action if it chose).  The Court again upheld Congress’ power to authorize
state prohibitions on liquor importation in James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311,
325–31 (1917).
preempted by federal law.27  Subsequent decisions established, invoking one
governing standard or another, that states possess a concurrent power to regulate
activities deemed within interstate commerce.28  By the middle of the twentieth
century, the Court had arrived at a steady formula for its dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.  That formula, still in force, posits a judicially-enforceable prohibition
on discriminatory or unduly burdensome state regulation.29
Of particular importance here, however, is that the Court has long sanctioned
congressional power to authorize state measures that otherwise would violate
dormant Commerce Clause prohibitions.30  Intimations of such a power in Congress
came early.  In 1851, for example, Cooley v. Board of Wardens emphasized that
Congress had provided for continued state regulation of river and harbor pilots in
finding that this was not an area requiring uniform national regulation.31  On a
slightly different note, a 1855 decision, Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Company, upheld an act of Congress authorizing two bridges over the Ohio river,
notwithstanding that the Court previously had found the bridges to obstruct
navigation on the Ohio.32  By 1891, the Court unanimously upheld a congressional
statute authorizing state regulation of imported liquor—even though the year before
it had found such state regulation, absent congressional sanction, to violate the
dormant Commerce Clause.33
As others have argued, why Congress has power to authorize state action that
violates the dormant Commerce Clause is not self-evident; nor are the Court’s
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34 See, e.g., Dowling, supra note 11, at 554; Monaghan, supra note 11, at 15; Williams, supra note 11,
at 156; see also Benjamin, 328 U.S. at 425 (noting that the Court had given different rationalizations for its
decisions upholding congressional power to authorize state discrimination).
35 328 U.S. 408 (1946); see also Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174–75
(1985).
36 328 U.S. at 429–33.
37 328 U.S. at 423.
38 Id. at 422.
39 Id. at 435–36.
40 See Dowling, supra note 11, at 556; Williams, supra note 11, at 157–58.
41 Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 (2005); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511,
522 (1935) (“The Constitution . . . . was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink
or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”)
explanations for this rule very satisfying.34  But the doctrine is nonetheless firmly
entrenched.  Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin35 is the leading modern decision.
There, the Court sustained the constitutionality of a South Carolina statute taxing
only out-of-state insurance companies, on the ground that the tax was authorized by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.36  That the South Carolina statute would violate the
dormant Commerce Clause absent the federal act was of no moment; Congress’
power to regulate interstate or foreign commerce was limited only by a requirement
that what is being regulated “affect [such commerce] sufficiently to make
[c]ongressional regulation necessary or appropriate.”37  Were Congress itself bound
by dormant Commerce Clause prohibitions, whether acting “alone or in coordination
with state legislation,” then its “power over commerce would be nullified to a very
large extent.”38  Instead, the only additional limits on congressional action under the
Commerce Clause were those constitutional restrictions “designed to forbid action
altogether by any power or combination of powers in our governmental system.”39
Benjamin’s emphasis on the presence of coordinated federal-state action is
somewhat perplexing, for it is hard to see why such coordination, considered alone,
could affect the South Carolina statute’s constitutionality.40  The Court has stated
repeatedly how important restraints on interstate commercial discrimination are to
our status as a nation, most recently identifying the dormant Commerce Clause’s
antidiscrimination requirements as “essential to the foundations of the Union.”41
Why, then, should congressional authorization make any difference to the validity
of state legislation that otherwise contravenes the dormant Commerce Clause?
Congressional power to conclusively determine the meaning of a constitutional
prohibition, let alone de facto overrule prior judicial determinations that a particular
form of state regulation is unconstitutional, seems fundamentally at odds with
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42 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803); Williams, supra note 11, at 154–55.  Henry Monaghan has
argued that as a result the dormant Commerce Clause is best viewed as a form of constitutional common law;
rooted in constitutional text, to be sure, but not intended to have the binding force on Congress enjoyed by other
constitutional limits.  See Monaghan, supra note 11, at 17. 
43 Generally, but not always.  For example, Congress is prohibited from giving preference to “the Ports
of one State over those of another,” and is also prohibited from imposing “Duties, Imposts and Excises” that are
not “uniform throughout the United States.”  U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 8,9.  This Uniformity Clause of Article I may
explain Benjamin’s emphasis on the presence of “coordinated” federal-state action, as it suggests Congress itself
could not provide that out-of-state insurers be taxed at differing rates than in-state insurers.  See, e.g., Benjamin,
328 U.S. at 434, 438; Cohen, Enigma, supra note 12, at 405. 
44 For the argument that current doctrine deviates from original expectations in not imposing any
uniformity requirement, as well as a discussion of the different possible meanings of uniformity, see Colby, supra
note 9. 
45 This is why the Court did not treat the federal statute as conclusive in Cooley.  See 53 U.S. 299,
319–21 (1851).
Marbury’s instruction that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”42  
The better answer lies implicit in Benjamin’s concern that precluding
Congress from authorizing state burdens on interstate commerce would infringe far
too much on Congress’ acknowledged power under the Commerce Clause.  That
power is plenary; Congress itself can enact legislation that imposes burdens on or
discriminates against interstate commerce.43   Put differently, there is no “uniformity”
requirement under the Commerce Clause, and thus Congress could incorporate, by
reference, discriminatory state law as federal law.44  That being the case, Congress
should also be able to conclude that the most appropriate approach is one that vests
regulatory power in the states, even to the extent of authorizing states to adopt
discriminatory legislation.    This doctrine recognizes that Congress is the best judge
of the national interest in the interstate commerce context, and its judgment that
discriminatory state regulation is appropriate requires respect.   Further, if Congress
itself can enact a discriminatory measure, then precluding Congress from instead
granting states discretion over whether to impose such a measure only undermines
the cause of national union.  Such a rule forces Congress to mandate discrimination
by all states when it concludes discrimination is justified rather than pursue the more
moderate tack of allowing states to discriminate if they choose.45 While this result
may make Congress more reluctant to authorize discrimination, it also may lead to
greater burdens on interstate commerce than Congress—and also the
states—consider necessary in particular contexts. 
My argument treats congressional authorization of discriminatory state
legislation as no different from any other form of congressional commerce
legislation.  That characterization might at first seem implausible.   After all, the
framers did not vest the power to regulate interstate commerce with the states, but
with Congress.  This considered decision appears overturned if Congress can simply
turn around and “delegate” the power to regulate interstate commerce back to the
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46 McCulloch v. Maryland’s argument for federal immunity from state taxation also seems pertinent
here: “In the legislature of the Union alone, are all represented.  The legislature of the Union alone, therefore,
can be trusted by the people with power of controlling measures which concern all, in the confidence it will not
be abused.” 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316, 431 (1819); see also Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National
Political Process 205–06 (1980).
47 See Roderick M. Hills Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National
Legislative Process,  U. Mich. Law Sch., Public Law Working Paper No. 27 at 16–21 (May 28, 2003), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=412000 (last visited March 9, 2006); Williams, supra note 11, at 197–202; Samuel
Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization: Grappling with the “Risk to the Rest of the
Country,” __ U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 101, 119–22, 137–38 (forthcoming 2006).  This argument features in dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, where lack of in-state interests that are similarly harmed by legislation can trigger
more rigorous scrutiny.  See South Carolina Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938); Ernest
J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 Yale L. J. 219, 229–30
(1957); Eule, supra note 25, at 443–44. 
48 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984).  Conceivably, a structural
argument could be made against allowing Congress to authorize state regulation in those areas reserved by the
Constitution for exclusive federal control.  For discussion of such an argument, see Cohen, Enigma, supra note
12, at 401–10.   Notably, though, the Court has not to date taken this view.  See, e.g., Hanover National Bank
v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).  In any event, such a federal exclusivity argument would have little impact on
the question of Congress’ power to authorize state violations of Article IV.  Implicit in Article IV’s targeting the
states with the Full Faith and Credit and Privileges and Immunities Clauses is recognition that the states have
power to regulate in these areas—otherwise the imposition of prohibitions against discrimination would make
little sense. 
49  Thus, for example, Congress might conclude that states should be able to experiment with interstate
discrimination as one method by which to address the problems of waste disposal.  See Solid Waste
Empowerment and Enforcement Act, H.R. 70, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (authorizing a variety of measures,
including different fees for disposing of out-of-state and in-state municipal waste); see also New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 151–55 (1992) (describing the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985, where Congress allowed states to bar access to their waste facilities to states who failed to adopt measures
states.46  Moreover, the regulatory product of state legislatures will likely differ
significantly from that which emerges from the national political process.  It seems
fair to expect that states will downplay harms to out-of-state interests for in-state
gain, at least where out-of-state interests lack effective in-state surrogates. 
Congress, by contrast, will be more responsive to interest groups with national
political presence and national economic clout.47 
This objection ignores an important distinction:  a determination by the
national legislature that state regulation, even state discrimination, is the best
regulatory response in a particular context is simply not equivalent to a state’s
decision to discriminate absent such authorization. “[W]hen Congress acts, all
segments of the country are represented and there is significantly less danger that one
State will be in a position to exploit others.  Furthermore, if a State is in such a
position, the decision to allow it is a collective one.”48  In short, Congress’
institutional position as the national elected body, containing representatives from
all the states, puts it in a unique position when it comes to authorizing interstate
discrimination. 
Moreover, a variety of legitimate national considerations might lead Congress
to favor interstate discrimination in a particular setting.  Congress might conclude
that discrimination is warranted as a means of encouraging regulatory
experimentation or forcing states to internalize the full costs of their actions.49
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for disposing of low-level wastes generated within their borders).  But see Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 903, 923–26 (1994) (arguing that state and
local governments generally will not be willing to experiment). 
50 International trade scholars are suspicious about this “infant industries” justification for deviation
from free trade principles, arguing that in those instances where investing in an industry is or ultimately will be
economically efficient, firms will do so without subsidies.  See, e.g., Robert E. Baldwin, The Case Against
Infant-Industry Tariff Protection, 77 J. Pol. Econ. 295 (1969).  But even if economically inefficient, long-term
industry protection still may be normatively justified, for example as a way of preserving communities otherwise
facing economic extinction or ensuring that states can  protect themselves against interstate competition
perceived as particularly threatening on non-economic grounds. 
51 See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 150–51 (describing concerns of states with nuclear waste facilities
that led to enactment of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985); Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 413–17, 429–31 (1946) (detailing tradition of state regulation of insurance and
congressional determination in the McCarran-Ferguson Act that such regulation should continue). 
52 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312–17 (1992); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation
of Electronic Commerce, 52 Tax L. Rev. 425, 480–90, 503–05 (1997); see also Bradley W. Joondeph, The
Meaning of Fair Apportionment and the Prohibition on Extraterritorial State Taxation, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 149,
171–82 (2002) (noting Court’s willingness to accept extraterritorial taxes when necessary for administratability).
Congress has responded to concerns about state and local taxation of electronic commerce with a temporary
moratorium on such taxes applied to internet access and multiple or discriminatory taxes.  See Internet Tax
Freedom Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-435, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (extending
moratorium to November 2007).
53 There is no need here to debate the merits of public choice theory or alternative accounts of elected
officials’ behavior.  See generally Jerry Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance (1999)  (describing and
critiquing public choice accounts of official action).  Whether their preferences derive directly from base self-
interest or more altruistic concerns, members of Congress will have particular views regarding what should be
interstate policy in a given area and in that sense are not disinterested.
Alternatively, it might conclude that, although economically inefficient when viewed
from the perspective of the nation as a whole, state economic protectionism
nonetheless was warranted in some circumstances to encourage development or
continuation of certain industries.50  Substantial interstate strife over an activity, or
simply a tradition of local regulation that states do not want displaced, are still other
reasons why in the past Congress has decided that interstate discrimination is
justified.51  Finally, Congress might conclude that freeing states from some dormant
Commerce Clause constraints is necessary to allow effective state regulation.  State
taxation of electronic commerce is a prime example here.  To effectively tax such
transactions, states may need to impose tax collection responsibilities on out-of-state
entities that lack physical presence within their borders, but under current doctrine
states lack the power to legislate extraterritorially in this fashion without
congressional authorization.52
This is not to suggest, of course, that Congress is “disinterested” in some
platonic sense when it comes to state regulation of interstate commerce.  To the
contrary, members of Congress can be expected to advance their own policy
preferences or those of particular interest groups—businesses and residents in their
states perhaps, or powerful national enterprises and associations.53  Congress is not
an umpire of interstate economic relations in the sense of a neutral arbiter enforcing
preset rules.  Instead, it is an umpire in the sense of being the entity that weighs
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54 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
55 For an interesting discussion of default rules in the context of constitutional law more generally, see
John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. __, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=897958.
56 Laurence Tribe maintains that the dormant Commerce Clause and Section 10 are in fact two distinct
constitutional models of federal-state relationships regarding matters affecting union.  See Tribe, Treatise, supra
note 12, § 6-35 at 1238.  Tribe bases his claim of distinction on the fact that the limits of dormant Commerce
Clause are inferred rather than express, a point he underscores because of his view that Congress “cannot
authorize a state to disregard an explicit constitutional prohibition.”  Id.  But he does not explain why the express
nature of a prohibition on the states should make such a difference, if that prohibition’s application to Congress
still has to be inferred.
57 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 10, cls. 2–3.
58 In very occasional dicta, the Court has indicated that Congress has the power to expand judicially-
prescribed full faith and credit requirements using its Effects Clause power.  See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,
486 U.S. 717, 728–29 (1988);  Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502
(1939).  The Court has stated that Congress’ ability to contract full faith requirements is an open question.  See
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n. 18 (1988) (plurality opinion); Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 US 287, 303 (1942) (citations omitted).
competing claims and determines how these claims should be balanced in the rules
that ultimately govern state behavior.  Just as the Court presumes that state
legislatures are in the best position to set economic and social policy within their
borders,54 so too it presumes Congress is in the best position to do so for the nation
as a whole—whether Congress legislating rules that will govern private behavior
directly or rules that determine how the states can govern in this area.
2.  The Constitutional Model for Interstate Regulation: Default Prohibitions
Subject to Congressional Override.  The model thus established by the Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is one of judicially-enforceable
constitutional default rules55 prohibiting state discrimination that are subject to an
ultimate congressional override.  Notably, this model is expressly mirrored in
Section 10 of Article I.56  That section imposes numerous prohibitions on the states.
Some of these, such as the prohibition on states impairing contracts, are
unconditional.  Many others, however—including several directly addressing
interstate relations, such as the ban on interstate compacts and restrictions on states’
ability to impose duties—are made waivable by Congress.57  
In the coupling of the Full Faith and Credit and Effects Clauses of its first
section, Article IV displays the same model of constitutional rules applicable to the
states combined with congressional discretionary authority.  Rather than simply
stopping after providing that each state shall accord other states’ acts, records, and
judicial proceedings full faith and credit—as had its forerunner provision in the
Articles of Confederation—Article IV proceeds to grant Congress power to “by
general laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”  Not surprisingly, given the dearth of Effects
Clause legislation, little precedent exists on the scope of Congress’ power under that
Clause, particularly regarding Congress’ power to contract the credit otherwise due
state laws and judgments.58 The parallel of the Commerce Clause and Article I,
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59 This is particularly true of the Territory and Property Clause, which requires that congressional
regulations regarding federal territory and property be “needful”—seemingly a minimal constraint—but does
not otherwise limit Congress in regard to the content, duration, or geographic range of the regulations it enacts.
See U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
60 On the relationship of interstate disputes over western land grants to the territory and property power,
see Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and Federal Regulation
of Private Property, 86 Minn. L. Rev.16–26 (2001); see also Federalist 7 (Hamilton), supra note 23, at 61–62
(arguing that absent union dispute over the western territories would lead the states to wage war with one
another).  On the way that the interstate divide over slavery manifested itself in regard to regulation of federal
territories and admission of new states, see Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in
American Law and Politics 100–87 (1978); see also Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and
Patterns of Conditions imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 Am. J. Legal. Hist. 119,140–41 (2004)
(discussing relationship of slavery and admission of Nebraska and Nevada after the Civil War).
61 The states’ adherence to similar republican principles was seen as necessary for their successful
union, as was assurance that they would come to each others’ defense.  See Federalist 43 (Madison), supra note
23, at 273. Arthur Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude,
46 Minn. L. Rev. 513, 522 (1961). Tom Lee has speculated that the Guarantee Clause may have been animated
by the idea that republication states would be unlikely to go to war with one another.  See Thomas H. Lee,
Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1027,
1036, 1052–53 (2002).
62 As initially included in the August 6th draft, the Clause required that “new States shall be admitted
on the same terms with the original states.”  2 Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787
at 188  (1911) [hereinafter, FARRAND].  Despite some delegates’ arguments “for fixing an equality of privileges
by the Constitution,” Gouverneur Morris’ proposal that this language be deleted so as not “to bind down the
Legislature to admit Western States on the terms here stated” was adopted.  Morris’ proposal was fueled by a
however, supports reading the Effects Clause as granting Congress power to redefine
the scope of the full faith and credit demand on the states, resulting in recognition
requirements that might be narrower or more expansive than those imposed by the
courts.  
This point applies to the remainder of Article IV as well.  Like the Commerce
and Effects Clauses, all of the grants of congressional power in Article IV are
expansive in scope.59  Moreover, the powers granted to Congress to regulate federal
territory and property, admit new states, and guarantee republican government all
have implications for interstate relations.  Historically, rivalries among the states
regarding western land claims provided a significant basis for the federal territory
power.  Subsequently, control over federal territories and admission of new states
became a central area of contention in interstate battles over slavery.60  Even outside
the battle over slavery, the terms on which new states are admitted affects interstate
relations as it establishes the basis for their relationship with existing states.  The
Guarantee Clause, in turn, sets certain minimal requirements regarding the form of
government and protections against spread of violence that states are entitled to
demand of other states as a condition of union.61 
Again, however, despite the grant of broad power to Congress, these sections
of Article IV impose few express conditions on Congress’ ability to discriminate
among the states.  The New State Clause, for example, contains no textual
requirement that new states be admitted on equal terms with existing states, and
records from the constitutional convention demonstrate that this omission was
intentional.62  Instead, the restrictions that the New State Clause does contain echo
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concern that an equality requirement would entitle the new states to equal representation in the Senate and
thereby “throw the power into the[] hands” of those settling the western lands.  Id. at 454; see also id. (remarks
by Williamson).  Madison argued that western states should not be degraded in rank, but the view that Congress
should be left flexibility on this question appears to have carried the day.  See id.; see also David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress: The Jeffersonians 1801–1829 at 243–45 (2001) (concluding that the framers rejected
state equality, although arguing this rejection is at odds with the principle of enumerated powers) [hereinafter
Currie, The Jeffersonians].  The more interesting question is what the framers meant by state equality, and in
particular whether Congress could attach ongoing and permanent conditions, such as prohibitions on slavery,
as a condition of admission; this issue rose to the fore with the admission of Missouri.  See id., at 219–49; see
also infra text accompanying notes 185–94.
63 U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3.
64 211 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1911).
65 Several commentators invoke this textual difference to argue that the Court should disavow its
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and rely on Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause instead.
See Eule, supra note 25, at 446–48; Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and
the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 Duke L.J. 569, 606–12. 
66 The Clause provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”  U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
67  See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 407 (1948)  (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting overlap
between Privileges and Immunities Clause and dormant Commerce Clause); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State
and the Market, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1097, 1222–28 (1988) (arguing that privileges and immunities were originally
defined in terms of rights of trade and commerce).
68 Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).  “Fundamental rights” is a term with
different meaning in different contexts; as discussed below, for due process and equal protection purposes,
economic rights are not deemed fundamental.  See infra text accompanying note 270.
Benjamin’s emphasis on coordinated national and state action, requiring both
congressional and state consent before a state can be divided in two or amalgamated
into a new state.63  Moreover, while the Court ultimately held in Coyle v. Smith that
Congress must admit new states on equal terms, notwithstanding the absence of an
express state equality requirement, it simultaneously emphasized that Congress can
impose conditions on particular states using its other powers.64
3.  Congressional Power Under Section 2 of Article IV.   Section 2 of Article
IV, which contains the Privileges and Immunities, Fugitive Slave, and Extradition
Clauses, stands out from the remainder of the article in its lack of any reference to
Congress.  Section 2 also differs notably from the dormant Commerce Clause in that
its prohibitions on the states are express.65
Nonetheless, the scope of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause
holds important lessons for an assessment of its authority under this section of
Article IV as well.  This is particularly true with respect to Congress’ power under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause,66 given the overlap between the activities to
which this clause applies and those regulatable by Congress under the commerce
power.67  Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause only prohibits state
discrimination against nonresidents affecting fundamental rights, much of
nonresidents’ economic activity falls into that category for Article IV purposes.68
Thus, invoking the Clause the Court has struck down state laws that tax nonresidents
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See Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005) (treating requirement that out-of-states wineries must open
branch offices in state as a condition for licensure as a residency requirement and invalidating it on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-32 (1946) (upholding
congressional authorization of state imposition of differential insurance tax rates as falling within the Commerce
Clause power); see also City of New York v. New York, 94 N.Y.2d 577, 587 (Ct. App. 2000) (invalidating tax
on out-of-state commuters on both Article IV Privileges and Immunities and dormant Commerce Clause
grounds).
71 See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869); see also Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 657–67 (1981) (describing erosion of the legal underpinnings for Paul’s holding that
grant of a corporate privilege is a special privilege that the state could grant on whatever terms it chose); Eule,
supra note 25, at 449–54; Redish & Nugent, supra note 65, at 610–11.  But see Brannon P. Denning, Why the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88
Minn. L. Rev. 384, 394, 406–07  (2003) (defending the exclusion of corporations).  
72 See, e.g. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, (2000) (construing federal arson statute as not
applying to an owner-occupied residence not used for commercial purposes to avoid constitutional question of
whether Congress’ commerce power extends to criminalizing such ‘traditionally local criminal conduct”);Ward
v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 430 (1870) (“Beyond doubt . . . [Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause]. . .
plainly and unmistakenly secures and protects the right of a citizen of one State . . . to take and hold real estate”
in another state and “to maintain actions in [its] courts.”).
at rates higher than residents, charge nonresidents higher license fees for engaging
in commercial activities, or impose residency requirements as a prerequisite for
certain forms of employment.69  These cases involve not only economic activities,
but economic activities with a clear interstate link, and thus would appear plainly to
come under the scope of the Commerce Clause as currently interpreted.70  If so,
however, Congress would seem to possess power to authorize the very
discriminatory state regulations currently prohibited by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.  
On the other hand, if Congress lacks power to contract Article IV privileges
and immunities protections in this fashion, then in practice its power to authorize
state discrimination under the Commerce Clause is considerably more limited than
generally thought.  Congress would still have some ability to do so, because these
two clauses have a different scope of application.  Of greatest  practical importance,
of course, is the doctrine that corporations can maintain dormant Commerce Clause
challenges but are excluded from the scope of Privileges and Immunities
protections—an anachronistic rule at odds with many modern decisions, but one that
nonetheless remains the law today.71  In addition, some Privileges and Immunities
protections for fundamental rights may not fall within the scope of the commerce
power, such as the right to hold property in another state or to sue in its courts, at
least as applied to noncommercial property or claims.72  Nonetheless, the clauses’
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topical overlap is quite broad, and thus Congress’ ability to authorize state
discrimination with regard to individuals’ economic activities would be substantially
curtailed were Congress  forced to adhere to privileges and immunities restrictions
on the states. 
 More generally, little reason exists to distinguish between congressionally-
sanctioned state violations of the dormant Commerce Clause and congressionally-
sanctioned state violations of Article IV’s Section 2.73  The Court has noted the
“mutually reinforcing relationship” and “common origin in the Fourth Article of the
Articles of Confederation”74 of the Privileges and Immunities and Commerce
Clauses.  Diametrically different accounts of congressional power under these
clauses therefore seem unjustifiable.  In particular, the pattern of combining
prohibitions on the states with a grant of power to Congress, evident in the Article
I’s Commerce Clause and Section 10 and also in the first section of Article IV,
makes divergence in Congress’ powers under the two articles an odd result.  Nor is
a solid policy justification apparent for such a divergence.  The underlying logic of
the Commerce Clause model appears to be that Congress is a well-positioned judge
of what the national interest requires.  If, therefore, Congress determines that certain
dormant Commerce Clause restrictions on the states are unnecessary to serve
national economic and political union, then Congress should have power to lift them.
The same logic would seem to apply to almost all limitations imposed on the states
by the Constitution in the name of national union.  
Equally important, no basis exists to distinguish between Congress’ power
to expand and its power to contract the limits imposed on the states by Article IV.
 Several scholars disagree, insisting, as Dean Kramer has put it, that “commitment
to Union is itself a fundamental value . . . Congress should not be permitted to define
its terms at will or legislate away the minimum requirements of mutual respect and
recognition it entails.”75  But this presumes that the terms of union are
constitutionally preset, as opposed to left to Congress, exactly the point at issue.  It
also takes an unduly simplistic view of constitutional structure.   As the Court
famously stated in Texas v. White, “[t]he preservation of the States, and the
maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National
Government.”76  Imposing excessive discrimination prohibitions on the states is as
harmful to “Our Federalism” as imposing insufficient ones.  Once the possibility of
any congressional readjustment of states’ relations is accepted—and acceptance of
some readjustment underlies the view that Congress can expand interstate
antidiscrimination requirements beyond those found by the courts to inhere in Article
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IV—why should Congress be precluded from rectifying excessive restrictions on the
states?   True, Congress clearly lacks power to legislate away the essential attributes
of federal union, but congressional easing of Article IV’s demands is hardly
equivalent to a pro tanto dissolution of the nation. 
These arguments suggest that, at a minimum, Congress should have broad
authority to waive prohibitions in Article IV’s Section 2 that relate to activities
Congress can independently regulate.  The source of this authority is simply power
elsewhere conferred upon Congress, in particular under the Commerce Clause.
Support also exists, from precedent as well as the structural dictate of congressional
primacy in interstate relations described above, for implying congressional power to
enforce Section 2’s anti-discrimination demands directly from that section itself.77
A more difficult question is whether Congress can authorize state violations of
Section 2 invoking only this latter, inferred power.  The logic of the structural
argument for congressional primacy in interstate relations suggest that Congress’
power should so extend.  That is, Congress should be able to authorize state
deviation from Section 2’s requirements when it concludes that so doing eases
interstate tension and promotes national unity.  On the other hand, deriving such
revisory congressional authority from a text that simply imposes prohibitions on the
states seems a rather remarkable feat of textual exegesis, all the more so given that
the need to make these prohibitions effective is the basis for inferring congressional
power in the first place.78  For now, however, it is sufficient to note that the scope of
activity subject to Section 2 but not coming within the commerce power is relatively
narrow.79  Accordingly, denial of congressional authority to waive Section 2’s
prohibitions in a non-commerce context would limit Congress’ revisory power over
Article IV in only a few contexts. 
4. The Difference Between Vertical and Horizontal Federalism.
Congressional primacy in structuring interstate relations, with the courts assigned a
subsidiary role, might at first blush seem implausible in light of recent decisions
emphasizing the Court’s role as ultimate arbiter of constitutional federalism.80   A
crucial variable distinguishes these decisions, however: they involved the vertical
dimension of federalism.  Structural differences between vertical and horizontal
federalism justify recognizing far broader congressional power in the latter context.
In vertical federalism cases, the underlying issue is one of federal versus state
power: can Congress impose an obligation on the states, expose them to financial
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liability, or preempt their field of operation.81    Horizontal federalism, by contrast,
concerns interstate relations: what burdens and restrictions can one state
constitutionally impose on another state and its residents.  Congressional intervention
adds a new federal actor to these interstate contests, but ordinarily does not change
their horizontal character.  This is most obvious when Congress authorizes interstate
discrimination that would otherwise be unconstitutional.  Such authorizations may
result in state regulation in lieu of direct federal regulation, but do not affect the
constitutional balance of federal and state powers, because Congress can always
enact a preemptive federal regime.  For example, Congress retains full constitutional
power to repeal its authorization of state regulation of insurance, although its
longstanding reliance on state regulation may make any such move politically
difficult.  
Congressional expansion of prohibitions on interstate discrimination might
more plausibly be characterized as falling within the vertical federalism mold: after
all, Congress would be imposing a federal duty that limits the states’ ability to
engage in what otherwise would be constitutionally-sanctioned discrimination.  Yet
even here the horizontal federalism dimension surfaces, and in ways that support
such congressional impositions.  Notably, Article IV’s prohibitions against interstate
discrimination are generally quite strict.  For example, where privileges and
immunities protections apply, the Court upholds state measures discriminating based
on residency only if it concludes that such discrimination is closely related to a
substantial government objective; indeed, at times it has gone so far as to require a
demonstration that nonresidents “constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the
statute is aimed.”82  Where Article IV’s direct constitutional prohibitions are thought
to be less strict, moreover, as in the case of application of full faith and credit
requirements to other states’ laws, the article expressly grants Congress power to
increase the states’ obligations.  Both of these features make congressional expansion
of Article IV’s prohibitions on interstate discrimination easier to justify as simply
enforcing the constitutional scheme.83
These different features mean that, among other things, congressional power
in horizontal federalism contexts raises far fewer concerns of congressional
aggrandizement.   This is true whether the focus is on Congress seeking to expand
federal power at the expense of the states as a whole, or on the danger that some
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85 521 U.S. at 516, 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803)).
86 New York, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926–30 (1997).
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88 529 U.S. 598, 613–19 (2000).
89 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 586 (1997); Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
states may harness federal power to impose their preferences on other states.84   And
it is fears of such aggrandizement that in large measure underlie the Court’s recent
decisions emphasizing the courts’ ultimate role in policing constitutional federalism.
Thus, in justifying greater judicial scrutiny of Section 5 legislation in City of Boerne
v. Flores, the Court invoked the fox-in-the-henhouse reasoning of Marbury v.
Madison, arguing that otherwise Congress would be able to set the limits on its own
power.85  In like vein, in its anticommandeering decisions—New York v. United
States and Printz v. United States—the Court reasserted some judicially-enforced
limits on congressional impositions on the states, expressing concern that otherwise
Congress could duck the political heat for its regulatory choices.86  
Similar concerns are absent from the Court’s horizontal federalism decisions.
Although the Court reasserted limits on the scope of the commerce power in United
States v. Lopez87 and United States v. Morrison,88 those were vertical federalism
decisions: the issue was federal power to regulate private activity, not federal
authority to regulate relations among the states.  By contrast, in dormant Commerce
Clause cases, when no question exists that the activity at issue falls within the scope
of the commerce power and the issue instead concerns interstate relations, the Court
emphasizes Congress’ ability to revise judicial decisions.  Concerns about the lack
of textual basis for the Court’s enforcement of dormant Commerce Clause limits, as
well as the Court’s dubious competency in identifying discriminatory regulation, are
regularly pushed aside on the grounds that Congress can rectify any judicial
mistakes.89 
New York and Printz further demonstrate that the Court is much more
comfortable with congressional regulation of interstate relations than with other
instances of congressional regulation of the states.  In New York, the Court upheld
Congress’ power to authorize state bans on interstate commerce in low-level nuclear
waste at the same time that it prohibited Congress from demanding that states either
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create in-state waste sites or take title to such wastes generated in their midst.90  In
Printz, the Court held unconstitutional congressional use of the commerce power to
impose regulatory duties on state executive officials. Yet it distinguished
congressional imposition of duties on state executive officials under the 1793
Extradition Act, arguing that this form of commandeering was justified because
Congress was acting pursuant to the Constitution’s Extradition and Effects Clauses.91
No doubt, occasions exist when congressional involvement in interstate
disputes raises greater dangers of aggrandizement and Congress appears to be using
its control over interstate relations to impose policies that it lacks power to legislate
directly.92  Whether this possibility should suffice to subject an otherwise valid
interstate relations measure outside of Congress’ powers, however, is much more
debatable.  It is well-established, for example, that Congress can employ its spending
power to achieve results that it lacks power to legislate directly.93  More to the point,
the fact that Congress is seeking to advance its own substantive agenda in an area
traditionally reserved for the states does generally not suffice to put a measure
outside the commerce power, and it is unclear why a different rule would apply when
Congress is legislating on interstate relations.94
5.  Considerations of Institutional Competency.  A final point that merits note
addresses the comparative institutional competency of Congress and the Court when
it comes to the interstate arena.95  The Court has struggled to make sense of the
interstate relations provisions of Article IV.  Read literally, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause suggests “the absurd result that, wherever the conflict [between different
states’ laws] arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the
other, but cannot be in its own.”96  To avoid such an anomalous result, current
doctrine recognizes that the Clause “does not compel ‘a state to substitute the statutes
of other states for its own statutes [when] dealing with a subject . . . [on] which it is
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competent to legislate.’”97  This means that a state must apply another state’s law
instead of its own only when it lacks significant contacts with the parties or the event
underlying the litigation, hardly a demanding standard or one that intuitively reflects
the clause’s demand that the states grant each others’ laws full faith and credit.98  Yet
the Court’s earlier efforts to enforce a more robust full faith and credit requirement
resulted in inconsistencies, due to the difficulty of ascertaining which states’ interests
were paramount in a particular case.99
In turn, enforcing Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause requires an
initial determination of what constitutes a privilege and immunity of state
citizenship. Two contrasting possibilities are immediately apparent: the Clause could
be understood to require that a state to accord citizens of other states a predetermined
set of rights, or alternatively, that a state must grant only the same rights and
privileges it grants its own citizens.  Early on, the Court rejected the former, natural
law-based account of the Clause for the latter, equal protection-based view.  But it
also has rejected the argument that the Clause prohibits all distinctions between in-
state and out-of-state residents:  “Some distinctions between residents and
nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual
States.”100  It is for this reason that the Court has held that the Clause protects only
fundamental rights, which in this context means those rights that are “basic to the
maintenance or well-being of the Union.”101  The Court’s efforts to render this
standard operational are again not the model of consistency; it has held, for example,
that states can impose discriminatory recreational but not commercial license fees.102
While this distinction reveals the commercial flavor of the Court’s view of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, it leaves unexplained why resentment and
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retaliation outside the commercial context is less threatening to the nation’s well-
being.103
Inconsistencies and theoretical tensions are also evident in the Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Here, too, the Court has been concerned
with matters commercial, trying—within the limits that inhere in judicial
lawmaking—to implement a vision of a national common market.  One question with
which the Court has struggled nobly is in distinguishing between a state’s legitimate
use of its resources to favor its own from unconstitutional economic protectionism.104
While the Court has developed mechanisms to increase decisional consistency, such
as its rule that facial discriminatory measures are virtually per se invalid, these
mechanisms are prone to criticisms of their own.  Measures can be facially
discriminatory but not protectionist, whereas facially neutral measures may on closer
inspection appear pernicious.105  Not surprisingly, the Court’s handiwork is often
held up for criticism as empirically flawed, or worse, constitutionally illegitimate.106
Part of the explanation for the Court’s difficulties is that the practical import
of these constitutional provisions is not clear, hardly a problem unique to the
interstate relations context nor one that in general suffices to call the propriety of
judicial involvement into question.  But part of the explanation is also that applying
these provisions requires the Court to make determinations that it is institutionally
ill-equipped to make.  Identifying violations often turns on assessing the relative
benefits and burdens of discriminatory measures and the importance of interstate
uniformity or equality in particular contexts.  Intuitively, such determinations seem
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with this assessment that congressional authorization of laws burdening interstate commerce are relatively rare.
See Williams, supra note 11, at 155 (“[G]iven this open-ended invitation [to authorize state regulations that
burden or discriminate against interstate commerce, Congress has done precisely that.”)  One complication in
assessing how willing Congress is to sanction state discrimination is that the Court is reluctant to read Congress
to fall more within Congress’ competency than the Court’s.  Congress’ factfinding
capacity—and its ability to chose and compromise among conflicting values—allows
it to investigate particular areas and legislate on discrete problems as they emerge,
such as interstate child custody disputes or interstate disputes over garbage, without
the necessity of devising rules capable of more general and principled application.
Moreover, past experience supports the view that Congress (particularly Congress
in combination with federal administrative agencies) is more competent in this area,
as  the Court has demonstrated little capacity to ferret out truly discriminatory state
legislation.107
  Most importantly, Congress’ political accountability makes it a better
barometer of when interstate restrictions threaten national union and when they do
not, as well as provides it with greater legitimacy in legislating substantive limits on
the states.108  “Congress comprises all interested parties and therefore is more likely
to take into account of all costs that a given rule imposes on the states.”109  The claim
that the political safeguards of Our Federalism are adequate to guard against
congressional encroachment on the states has garnered substantial criticism.110  But
the case for political safeguards has more merit in the interstate relations context,
given the mitigated fears of congressional self-dealing.111  This is particularly true
when Congress acts to authorize state discrimination.  As William Cohen cogently
put it over twenty years ago, whatever debate exists about the adequacy of political
safeguards as a check on Congress imposing excessive restrictions on the states, “it
is harder to argue that there is a need to monitor decisions by the national legislature
that exalt state power at the expense of national power.”112  It also merits noting that
Congress has authorized very little state discrimination against interstate commerce,
despite its long-established power to do so.113  DOMA and recently proposed
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as doing so, and therefore requires a clear and fairly specific statement from Congress before such authorization
is found.  See Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003).   
114 See Thorton Anderson, Creating the Constitution: The Convention of 1787 and the First
Congress102 (1993); Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in
Contemporary Comment, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 432, 443–46, 468–75 (1941); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw,
Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but
Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 35–36 (1999). 
measures may suggest that Congress is becoming more willing to sanction such state
discrimination; nonetheless, it is still a leap to conclude that these measures
demonstrate the failure—as opposed to the proper functioning—of political
safeguards.  
B. Constitutional Text and History Do Not Preclude Congressional
Power to Authorize State Conduct that Otherwise Violates Article IV.
These arguments for according Congress broad control over interstate
relations, including the power to authorize state conduct that contravenes judicial
understandings of Article IV’s interstate prohibitions, are largely structural.
Ultimately, they rest upon claims about the relationship between Article I and Article
IV, as well as inferences drawn from the powers granted Congress under these
articles.  Significantly, nothing in the Constitution’s text and history, or for that
matter in the Court’s precedent, precludes such a spacious conception of
congressional authority.  Regarding the commerce power, this should come as no
surprise, given the absence of textual references to the states as well as the scant
attention the Commerce Clause received at the federal constitutional convention and
state ratifying conventions114—not to mention the Court’s longstanding and
frequently reaffirmed view that Congress can authorize state violations of the
dormant Commerce Clause.
But Article IV seems at first blush to be a different story.  Two textual
points—the linkage of the Full Faith and Credit and Effects Clauses, and the absence
of any express grant of power to Congress in Section 2—appear to counsel against
implying broad congressional authority over Article IV’s scope.  The historical role
of Article IV in fostering national union also seems to weigh against an expansive
view of Congress’ powers.  In fact, however, none of these preclude granting
Congress broad control over the scope of the article’s interstate prohibitions.
1.  The Text and History of the Effects Clause. The Effects Clause itself is
broad and unconditional in tone.  The only express condition imposed by the Clause
is that in specifying the effect of out-of-state laws and judgments or their manner of
proof, Congress must proceed by means of “general laws.”  The import of this
requirement is somewhat ambiguous; “general laws” could be read as preventing
measures targeting a specific state’s laws or a specific judgment (akin to the
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115 U.S. Const. art I, §§ 9, 10.
116 For contrasting discussions of the meaning of the general laws requirement, compare Mark  Strasser,
Legally Wed: Same Sex Marriage and the Constitution 134–36 (1997) and Julie L. B. Johnson, Comment, The
Meaning of “General Laws”: The Extent of Congress’ Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and The
Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1611, 1639–43 (1997) with The Defense
of Marriage Act:  Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 42, 57 (1996) (Letter
from Michael W. McConnell to Senator Orrin G. Hatch) and Rosen, DOMA, supra note 10, at 941–44.
117 See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937) (stating, in rejecting a challenge to
spending measure as not for the general welfare, “[t]he line must still be drawn between . . . particular and
general.  Where this shall be placed cannot be known through a formula in advance. . . . The discretion belongs
to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong.”); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 & n.2
(1987) (suggesting “general welfare” restriction on spending in fact may not be judicially enforceable); Regional
Rail Reorg’n Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 158–59 (1974) (holding that bankruptcy statute applying only to eight
railroads in a particular geographic region did not violate the “uniform laws” requirement of the Bankruptcy
Clause).  Bankruptcy is a particularly pertinent comparison.  The general laws requirement is textually similar
to the requirement of “uniform laws” in bankruptcy; indeed, the congressional power over bankruptcy was first
proposed during discussion on the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Underlying adoption of the Article I Bankruptcy
Clause and its uniformity requirement was concern about state enactment of private bankruptcy laws.  For this
reason, the Court has read “uniform laws” as precluding laws applying to particular debtors, not as prohibiting
bankruptcy laws specific to particular types of contexts.  Railway Labor Execs’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457,
471–72 (1981).   By analogy, the general laws requirement of the Effects Clause suggests concern with full faith
and credit demands that single out specific states’ laws and judgments for lack of recognition. 
118 See McConnell, supra note 116, at 57; Rosen, DOMA, supra note 10, at 952–54; Whitten, supra note
10, at 377–86; see also Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 246–55 (14th ed. 1978)
(stating Congress has power to specify certain decrees will have no effect to achieve uniformity).
Constitution’s prohibitions on bills of attainder115), or alternatively as limiting
Congress’ ability to target a narrow category of laws and judgments for special
treatment.116  The former seems the better reading.  The alternative view requires
some constitutional benchmark against which the breadth or narrowness of
congressional legislation could be adjudged.  How such a baseline should be
established is far from clear; could Congress, for example, establish choice of law
rules governing product liability actions alone, or must it legislate regarding all tort
actions?  In other contexts, the Court has essentially refused to review congressional
determinations that a measure is sufficiently general in its benefits or scope to meet
analogous constitutional requirements, and a similar approach is warranted here.117
Either way, however, the “general laws” provision by itself would not prevent
Congress from providing that classes of acts, records, and proceedings deemed
sufficiently general should receive more or less credit than they would under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as judicially enforced.  Similarly, nothing in the phrase “the
effect thereof” textually precludes reading the Clause as granting Congress broad
power over the scope of the Constitution’s full faith and credit demand.  On its face,
this language is perfectly compatible with Congress determining that certain state
laws and judgments should receive greater credit than they would absent
congressional action, as well as with concluding that their effect should be more
limited.  No effect, after all, is a form of effect.118  A useful contrast is to Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the grant of power to Congress to “enforce”
the amendment’s substantive protections does imply that congressional enactments
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119 U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 5; see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).   Mark Strasser
argues to the contrary that City of Boerne and the Section 5 power support viewing Congress’ power to deny
effect to laws and judgments as limited, but does not address whether “enforce” and “effect” carry the same
limiting connotations.  See Strasser, supra note 10, at  326; see also Letter from Laurence H. Tribe to Senator
Edward M. Kennedy, 142 Cong. Rec. S5931, S5933 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) [hereinafter Tribe, Letter]
(maintaining that Congress’ enforcement power under section 5 represents “perhaps the closest analogy” to its
Effects Clause power but not discussing textual differences between the two); compare McConnell, supra note
116, at 57–58 (contrasting meaning of “enforce” and “prescribe. . . effect”).   For discussion of whether Section
5’s “enforce” language is appropriately read as giving Congress very limited power to deviate from judicial
constructions of the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
120 See Tribe, Letter, supra note 119, at S5932 (stating that “it is as plain as words can make it” that
“the congressional power to ‘prescribe . . . the effect’ of sister-state acts, records, and proceedings” does not
extend to “prescrib[ing] that some acts, records, and proceedings that would otherwise be entitled to full faith
and credit under the . . . Clause as judicially interpreted shall instead be entitled to no faith or credit at all.”).
121 Moreover, Tribe’s argument appears to mean that Congress is precluded from prescribing that a
state’s acts, records, or proceedings have no effect in certain circumstances even if that result is what would
obtain directly under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which seems an implausible result. 
122  U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
123 Indeed, often both clauses are singly referred to as the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D.Fla. 2005).  The Effects Clause is separately identified here
for the sake of clarity.
124 Kramer, supra note 10, at 2004; see also Koppelman, DOMA, supra note 10, at 21 (“The second
sentence [of the Full Faith and Credit Clause] should not be read in a way that contradicts the first.”); Strasser,
supra note 10, at 308–13 (same).
dramatically restricting these protections would be invalid.119  Moreover, even if “the
effect” is read as requiring some positive effect, as Laurence Tribe has argued,120
Congress could still prohibit states from recognizing certain classes of laws and
judgments.  By so doing, Congress would not be mandating no effect, but rather
providing that such laws and judgments would have effect only in the state that
issued them.121
The strongest textual basis for viewing Congress’ power under the Effects
Clause as limited comes not from the language of the Effects Clause itself, but rather
from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which provides that “Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State.”122  The two clauses are closely linked, with the Effects Clause
even textually referring to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.123  Several commentators
have argued that the mandatory and uncompromising nature of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause militates against reading the Effects Clause to allow Congress to limit
the credit that otherwise due state judgments and laws.  As Larry Kramer has put it,
the “unqualified ‘full’ and mandatory ‘shall’ [of the former clause] lose some
(though obviously not all) of their meaning if Congress can simply legislate the
requirement away.”124
To be sure, the presence of express prohibitions on the states in the Full Faith
and Credit Clause—as well as in the provisions of Article IV’s Section 2—marks an
important difference between Article IV and the Commerce Clause.  In the end,
however, reading Congress as unable to reduce states’ obligations under judicial
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125 See Rosen, DOMA, supra note 10, at 959–76.
126 See McConnell, supra note 116, at 58; Sack, supra note 10, at 893.
127 See Rosen, DOMA, supra note 3, at 944.
128 The Effects Clause originated in a suggestion by James Madison that Congress “might be authorized
to provide for the execution of judgments,” with Madison stating that he thought such a role for Congress “was
justified by the nature of the Union.”  2 FARRAND, supra note 62, at 448.  Only Randolph objected, arguing “there
was no instance of one nation executing the judgments of another nation.”   Gouverneur Morris then proposed
adding language that would give Congress even broader responsibilities, specifically that “the Legislature shall
by general laws, determine the proof and effect of such acts, records, and proceedings.”  Id.  This proposal was
submitted to the Committee on Detail, but as noted, however, the version that subsequently emerged from the
Committee was more limited.   See id. at 485. 
129 See id. at 488–89. 
interpretations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not a convincing account.
Congress, after all, is nowhere expressly subjected to the full faith and credit
requirement; instead, that requirement by its terms references only the states.   This
textual absence is particularly striking, given that the presence of the Effects Clause
demonstrates a clear expectation that Congress would legislate in this area of
interstate relations.  At a minimum, as Mark Rosen has argued, the phrasing of the
two clauses suggests that Congress has an important role to play in determining what
“full effect” entails.125   In addition, reading Congress as limited by judicial
interpretations of full faith and credit has perverse consequences, for it renders the
Effects Clause largely nugatory as a means of mediating conflicting choice of law
rules among the states.  Under this reading, Congress would lack power to specify
which acts, records, or laws should receive credit in any context when those of more
than one state have a legitimate claim to recognition.  Such a measure necessarily
serves to deny credit to the competing acts, records, or judgments that do not satisfy
the congressional criteria.126  The result would be to disable Congress from acting
under the Effects Clause in precisely those contexts where congressional action
seems most needed to ensure uniformity.127
The drafting history of the two clauses further undermines any claim that
Congress is precluded from restricting the scope of the full faith and credit demand.
As the clauses emerged from the Committee on Detail, Congress was limited to
determining the effects of judgments; more importantly, Congress’ responsibility to
legislate in the area was mandatory, whereas the initial full faith and credit
instruction to the states was hortatory.128  In the ensuing debate, the convention
expanded the scope of the Effects Clause to grant Congress authority to specify the
effect of acts and records as well as judicial proceedings, and at the same time
adopted a proposal by Madison to reverse the mandatory and discretionary character
of the two clauses.129  This simultaneous move to make the Full Faith and Credit
Clause mandatory and the Effects Clause discretionary weighs against reading the
former’s mandatory language as directed at Congress.  A more logical explanation
is that the framers sought to make full faith and credit self-executing, thereby
ensuring that congressional inaction did not prevent enforcement of the full faith and
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130 See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Piper v. New Hampshire, 723 F.2d 110, 113 (1st
Cir.) (opinion of Bownes & Coffin, JJ.) (positing that Congress lacks power to abrogate the guarantees of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause but offering no analysis);  Black, supra note 18, at 65 (arguing the
“impersonally peremptory language” of the Privileges and Immunities Clause suggests it might bind Congress);
Kathleen Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 306 (14th ed. 2001) (“[T]he Privileges and Immunities
Clause is a rights provision, not a grant of authority to Congress, and so is arguably nonwaivable by Congress”);
Denning, supra note 71, at 394, 412 (arguing that the text of the Privileges and Immunities Clause appears to
precludes Congress from authorizing interstate discrimination); Redish & Nugent, supra note 65, at 591
(describing the Clause as a constitutional absolute that Congress lacks power to waive).
131 The closest the Court has come is its 1999 decision in Saenz v. Roe, where the Court held that
Congress lacks power to authorize state violations of the right to move to a new state and be treated like existing
citizens, an element of the right to travel protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999)
(holding that provision of federal statute authorizing one-year state durational residency requirements for welfare
benefits could not render California statute imposing such a residency requirement constitutional).  As another
aspect of the right to travel is also protected under Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, see, e.g., Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200-01 (1973), Saenz could be read as establishing that Congress is similarly limited
regarding Article IV.  This view of Saenz accords with the Court’s passing comment in Bray v. Alexandria’s
Women’s Health Clinic that the right to travel “does not derive from the negative Commerce Clause, or else it
could be eliminated by Congress.” 506 U.S.263, 276 n.7 (1993).  For greater discussion of Saenz and the
distinctions between the Fourteenth Amendment and Article IV, see Part II.B, infra.
132 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 59 (1842).
credit demand; but they also intended to leave Congress with power to legislate
regarding the effects of laws and judgments if it so chose.  
In sum, Article IV’s text imposes few limits on Congress’ ability to determine
the extent to which states must recognize other states’ laws and judgments.  It may
be that giving fair weight to the Full Faith and Credit Clause precludes Congress
from largely legislating away comity.  But such a measure might well fail on
rationality grounds in any event, as it is hard to see how a broad retraction of comity
is plausibly related to any legitimate interest Congress might have in exercising its
Effects Clause powers.
 2.  Section 2’s Textual Silence Regarding Congress.  Perhaps the most
striking feature of Article IV’s text for assessing congressional authority is the
absence of any reference to Congress in Section 2 of the article.  This absence is
especially salient because all the adjacent sections of Article IV expressly invest
Congress with power to act.  Given the enumerated powers conception of the federal
government’s authority, this omission appears to compel the conclusion that
Congress lacks any power to implement Section 2 or alter the scope of its
requirements.  Unsurprisingly, many commentators believe this to be the case.130
The Court, however, has never directly considered Congress’ powers under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, either to implement that Clause’s protections
or to authorize states to disregard its requirements.131  On the other hand, the Court
has long held that Congress could enact legislation to enforce the remainder of
Section 2’s demands, despite the lack of an explicit power to act.  The Court’s well-
known decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania132 involved a challenge to the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law, enacted to prevent
slaveowners and their agents from kidnapping individuals claimed to be fugitive
slaves in Pennsylvania and then removing them from the state.  In his opinion for the
Court holding that Pennsylvania’s law was unconstitutional, Justice Story concluded
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133 See id. at 615–16. 
134 Id. at 618–19. 
135 For discussion of what scope of state action Prigg allowed, see Paul Finkelman, Sorting out Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 24 Rutgers L. J. 605, 641–57 (1993).  This aspect of the decision provoked the strongest
dissents.  See, e.g., Prigg, 41 U.S. at 627–28 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
136 Antislavery forces condemned the Court’s sanction of federal involvement in returning fugitive
slaves and its invalidation of state efforts to prevent free blacks from being kidnaped; slavery supporters attacked
the Court’s conclusion that Congress could not force the states to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause, claiming
that it made “the [C]lause . . . a ‘dead letter,’ as there were not enough federal judges to do the job.” David P.
Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Descent into the Maelstrom, 1829–1861 at 184 (2005) (quoting Senator
Mason of Virginia) [hereinafter Currie, Descent]; see Carl B. Swisher, V The History of the Supreme Court of
the United States: The Taney Period 1836–64 at 535–47 (1974).  Interestingly, however, response to  the decision
was muted at first.  See Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North 1780–1861,
at 104–07 (1974).   For more recent criticism, see Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused 186–87, 232–41 (1975);
Fehrenbacher, supra note 60, at 43–47; Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v.
Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 247 [hereinafter, Finkelman,
Story Telling]; Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law:  Justice Story, Slavery, and Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1086, 1128–38 (1993).
137 See Currie, Descent, supra note 136, at 185–94 (discussing congressional debates over the
constitutionality of the 1850 fugitive slave law and to prohibit slavery in the territories); Paul Finkelman, Story
Telling, supra note 136, at 269–73 (discussing prior case law on Congress’ power to enforce the Fugitive Slave
Clause).  
138 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 432–42, 446–47 (1856) (holding that the Territory and Property
Clause only applied to territory that was ceded to the United States under the Articles of Confederation and only
authorized Congress to dispose of public lands, not to govern).
that Congress had not only power but an obligation to enact legislation enforcing the
Fugitive Slave Clause of Section 2.133  Congressional power and duty followed from
the inclusion of the right to enforce delivery of fugitive slaves in the national
constitution.  The absence of any express grant of congressional authority was
irrelevant: “The end being required, it has been deemed a just and necessary
implication, that the means to accomplish it are given also.”134  Indeed, Story went
so far as to hold that Congress’ power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause was
exclusive and precluded states from legislating on the subject, at least in ways that
added burdens for claimants seeking to recapture slaves.135
Prigg was a highly contentious decision, criticized by slavery opponents and
supporters alike.136  Although its ruling of federal exclusivity provoked more
criticism, a few members of Congress and several state courts denied that Congress
possessed any power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause at all.137  Moreover,
Prigg’s expansive view of congressional power under the Fugitive Slave Clause
contrasts notably with the crabbed account offered by the Court fifteen years later
in Dred Scott when interpreting the same article’s Territory and Property Clause—
notwithstanding that this latter provision seems, on its face, a far more hospitable
location for recognition of broad congressional authority.138 Dred Scott’s narrow
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Territory and Property Clause, see Kleppe v. New Mexico,  426 U.S. 529, 539-41 (1976) (stating “the power over
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140 65 U.S. 66, 104–05 (1861); see also Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S.  80, 94 (1885) (“There is no express
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for extradition demands are authenticated.  See 65 U.S. at 105.
141 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 US 898, 908–09 & n.3 (1997) (characterizing Congress’
imposition of duties on state officials under the Extradition Act as being “in direct implementation . . . of the
Extradition Clause of the Constitution itself” and authorized by the Effects Clause); California v. Superior Court,
482 U.S. 400, 407 (1987) (reaffirming Dennison’s holding regarding congressional power).  Dennison’s further
determination that the federal government lacks the power to compel states to perform the mandatory duties
imposed by the Extradition Clause and implementing legislation has not fared as well.  In Puerto Rico v.
Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987), the Court ruled that the duties imposed by the Extradition Clause and the
Extradition Act were judicially enforceable.  See id. 
142 See supra notes 67–71.
conception of the territory and property power has been rejected,139 but the Court has
never disowned Prigg’s conclusion that, Section 2’s silence notwithstanding,
Congress has implied power to enforce its requirements.  On the contrary, shortly
thereafter in Ex Parte Kentucky v. Dennison the Court reached a similar conclusion,
this time regarding Section 2’s Extradition Clause.  Dennison held that duty to
“provid[e] by law the regulations necessary to carry [it] into execution . . . manifestly
devolved upon Congress.”140  Moreover, recent decisions have reaffirmed Dennison’s
holding that Congress has power to legislate under the Clause.141
More to the point, focusing on the presence or absence of express grants of
congressional power in Article IV ignores a key part of the textual equation: grants
of congressional power elsewhere.  In fact, the Constitution does contain an express
textual grant of power to regulate much of the subject matter that arises under Article
IV’s Section 2, or at least under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,142 that grant
being the Commerce Clause of Article I.  Once Article I is added to the picture, the
textual question radically changes:   Instead of being whether Section 2’s silence
regarding Congress precludes that body from legislating regarding the states’
privileges and immunities obligations, it becomes whether this silence also limits by
implication Congress’ otherwise broad power to act under the Commerce Clause.
No textual reason exists to interpret Section 2’s silence differently in the context of
Article IV alone.  Hence, if silence on the role of Congress precludes Section 2 itself
from authorizing congressional action, then the same silence should also preclude
Section 2 from limiting congressional exercise of powers elsewhere granted.  
Indeed, when read against the background of Article I, Section 2’s silence
regarding Congress ends up supporting congressional power to authorize state
contraventions of its provisions.  The logical location for restrictions on
congressional exercise of the commerce power is Article I itself.  In fact, Section 9
of that article contains several limitations, such as the prohibition on Congress giving
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Anderson, supra note 114, at 102–06; Colby, supra note 24, at 273–84.
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significant difference is that the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause excluded language in the
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145 Art. Confed., art. IV. cl. 1. (1777).
146 Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Milwaukee County v. M.E.
White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935) (addressing the Full Faith and Credit Clause); see also Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (same); Estin v. Estin, 334 US 541, 545-46 (1948) (describing the clause
as having “substituted a command for the earlier principles of comity and thus basically altered the status of the
States as independent sovereigns.”). 
147 California v. Superior Court 482 U.S. 400, 403 (1987) (addressing the Extradition Clause); see also
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371 380–81 & n.19 (1978)  (addressing the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
preference to the ports of one state over another, that demonstrate the framers’
awareness of how congressional commercial regulation could affect interstate
relations.143  Yet Section 9 is barren of restrictions on Congress that in any way
mirror the specific provisions of Article IV.  At a minimum, given their obvious
topical overlap, if the Privileges and Immunities Clause were intended to limit
Congress in its exercises of its Commerce Clause power, one would expect that
intent to have been stated clearly in Article IV’s text.
3. The Union-Forging Purpose of Article IV.  A final argument against
congressional power to authorize state discrimination in violation of Article IV rests
on the article’s union-forging purpose.  The provisions that ultimately became
Article IV, particularly the prohibitions on interstate discrimination contained in the
Article’s first two sections, generated little discussion at either the constitutional
convention or during ratification.144  It is nonetheless clear that the framers intended
the article, especially Sections 1 and 2, to help forge the states into closer union.
This is, in part, evident from the article’s immediate predecessor, Article IV of the
Articles of Confederation, which opened with the words: “The better to secure and
perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States
in this Union.”145  The Court has frequently emphasized the state-uniting purpose of
Article IV, describing it as animated by the purpose of making the states “integral
parts of a single nation”146 and constituting “an essential part of the Framers’
conception of national identity and Union.”147
Article IV’s union-forging provisions were centrally implicated in escalating
fights over slavery.  Increasingly, they yielded to the profound strains of sectional
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150 See Currie, The Jeffersonians, supra note 17, at 246; Finkelman, Imperfect Union, supra note 148,
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division. Northern state courts adopted the view that bringing slaves into a state
where slavery was prohibited, even as part of travel to a slave state, served to free
them; southern states prohibited entry by free blacks and refused to recognize other
states’ judgments granting rights to free blacks.148  Northern states enacted personal
liberty laws to protect free blacks claimed as fugitive slaves and refused to extradite
individuals accused of encouraging slaves to run away; southern states supported
aggressive fugitive recaption efforts and refused to extradite alleged free black
kidnappers.149  Both sides contended that the other’s actions violated the comity
demands contained in Article IV.150  In fact, this period was Article IV’s heyday;
never before or since has it figured so dominantly in political and legal discussion.
In particular, the issue of Congress’ power to ban slavery in the territories consumed
years of congressional attention and debate.151  
The central importance placed by Article IV, especially its first two sections,
on securing union counsels against recognizing congressional power to contract their
antidiscrimination prohibitions.  On this premise, that the framers granted power to
Congress so as to allow it to augment Article IV’s interstate demands seems more
plausible.  The Effects Clause, for example, seems motivated by the framers’ belief
that congressional power was needed to ensure that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
had real practical bite.152  This account, in turn, readily leads to a one-way ratchet
view under which Congress could expand, but not contract, the Constitution’s full
faith and credit demand.153  Subsequent history, moreover, offers some support for
this view and perhaps a narrower account of congressional power.   Even those who
argued that Congress could ban slavery in the territories did not contend more
generally that Congress could authorize violations of Article IV.  Instead, if anything
members of Congress debated whether Congress had power to enforce Article IV’s
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154 See Currie, Descent, supra note 136, at 133-72 (describing debates over Congress’ power to ban
slavery in the territories; Fehrenbacher, supra note 60, at 100–87 (same).  Some members of the Reconstruction
Congress and President Johnson claimed Congress lacked power to enforce Article IV and thus to enact the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, leading to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Currie, Descent, supra note 136,
at 170 n.71; Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution, and Congress, 1863–1869 at 39, 55, 63–66 (1990).
Given Prigg and Denison, however, the most likely basis for this claim appears to be that the act addressed a
state’s treatment of its own citizens as well as nonresidents, a relationship Article IV had not been interpreted
to reach, rather than that Congress lacked power to enforce Article IV at all. 
155 For discussions of the drafting history of the New State and Effects Clauses, see supra notes 62,
128, and accompanying text.  Gouverneur Morris proposed language nearly identical to the current Territory and
Property Clause during debate on what was then the new state article.  See 2 FARRAND, supra note 62, at 466.
Despite the facial breadth of the proposed language, Morris’ amendment passed without much debate, and the
Territory and Property Clause also largely escaped comment during ratification.  See Appel, supra note 60, at
25–30.   Morris was not the first to suggest such a power; earlier Madison had proposed giving Congress power
to “dispose of unappropriated lands” and “institute temporary Governments for New States arising therein.”  2
FARRAND, supra note 62, at 324.  As David Currie has argued, the choice of Morris’ more general and
empowering phrasing “suggest[s] the propriety of a broad construction.”  David P. Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: Article IV and Federal Powers, 1836–64, 1983 Duke L. J. 695, 734 n. 251. 
156  For example, only Edmund Randolph opposed Morris’ motion to expand Congress’ Effects Clause
power to cover laws and records on the grounds that that Congress’ powers would be too broad.  2 FARRAND,
supra note 62, at 489.
157 2  FARRAND, supra note 62,  at 466–67, 628–29; see also William M. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause
of the U.S. Constitution 60–73 (1972); Bonfield, supra note 61, at 519–22.
requirements on the states at all, a debate that carried over to Reconstruction and
contributed to adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.154 
But the historical record is not univocal, and it also offers plausible support
for a more expansive view of congressional power.  Evidence on how the grants of
congressional power in Article IV were originally understood is skimpy at best.
None of these grants sparked much concern or debate, notwithstanding that all
represented departures from Article IV’s progenitor in the Articles of Confederation
and, at least on their face, appeared to grant Congress quite broad authority.  Indeed,
the drafting history of the Effects and New State Clauses demonstrates efforts by the
convention to expand Congress’ powers.155  Concerns about the potential breadth of
federal power were really only raised in regard to the Guarantee Clause,156 but the
debates also show that even there general agreement existed on the importance of
including such a federal guarantee.157 
This lack of concern about broad grants of congressional power may simply
reflect the framers’ expectation that Congress would use its powers to provide further
protections against interstate discrimination.  On the other hand, the absence of
debate might instead reflect widespread agreement that granting Congress discretion
over interstate relations was a better means of achieving union than relying on
absolute constitutional prohibitions.  Support for this alternative view comes from
the latter sections of Article IV.  Although lacking the direct interstate focus of the
first two sections of Article IV, as noted above the New State, Territory and
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159 See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1871); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419, 445– 46 (1827); Federalist 42 (Madison), supra note 23, at 267–68; Abel, supra note 114, at 443–46
(detailing consensus on the value of the commerce power).
160 For example, Madison laid weight on the commerce power in his list of congressional powers that
“provide for harmony and proper intercourse among the States” and also justified the commerce power in part
on the grounds that other states’ experience proved the “necessity of a superintending authority over reciprocal
trade of confederated states.”   Federalist 42 (Madison), supra note 23, at 267–68.  But see Abel, supra note 114,
at 450–51, 470–76 (arguing that the commerce power was understood narrowly as a means of preventing
interstate discrimination).
161 See, e.g., Currie, Descent, supra note 136, at 184–94.
162 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
163 See, e.g., Currie, Descent, supra note 136, at 157–94, 196–200; Potter, supra note 151, at 53–57,
118–20.
Property, and Guarantee Clauses were understood to have an interstate dimension.158
Yet the framers chose to address these areas of potential interstate contention through
granting authority to Congress.  This point stands out even more clearly in the
framers’ decision to address interstate commercial discrimination primarily through
vesting the commerce power in Congress.  Providing Congress with this power was
viewed by many delegates as one of the Constitution’s most important
achievements,159 and it was understood as a means of securing union and regulating
relations among the states.160
Similarly, the pre-civil war period offers grounds for inferring a more
expansive view of congressional power over interstate relations.   Most members of
Congress appear to have agreed that Congress had authority to enforce the Fugitive
Slave Clause, focusing their debate instead on whether Congress should do so and
the limited protections for free blacks in the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act.161  Given the
political contentiousness of the 1850 Act, the fact that few of its opponents seriously
contested Congress’ power to enact the measure is noteworthy.  This was also a time
in which the Court began to suggest that Congress could authorize state impositions
on interstate commerce.162  The history of this period further makes clear the
importance of congressional power to securing union.  For many years, two
congressional measures—the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and to a far lesser extent
the 1850 Compromise—played a central role in preserving the nation in the face of
increasing sectional divides.163 
  In the end, Article IV’s historical record—both at drafting and ratification,
and in subsequent decades—offers perhaps the best argument against recognition of
congressional power to lift the article’s constraints on the states.  But evidence on
this score is too limited and equivocal to trump the strong structural arguments for
broad congressional power in the interstate arena, particularly given the
compatibility of an expansive view of Congress’ role with constitutional text and
with longstanding dormant Commerce Clause precedent.
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Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), uphold the first type of autonomy; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the latter.  See Ernest Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 Tex L Rev. 1, 13–15, 23–32  (2004) (defining state autonomy and contrasting autonomy and
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II.  LIMITS ON CONGRESS’ POWERS OVER INTERSTATE RELATIONS
Fully accepting the structural argument for congressional primacy in
interstate relations expounded in Part I still leaves the question of the exact
magnitude of Congress’ power in this context.  What limits, if any, exist on
Congress’ ability to structure interstate relationships and to contract or expand
Article IV’s interstate antidiscrimination demands?  As discussed below, state
sovereignty might seem a likely repository for some such constraints; in fact,
however, it supports little curtailment on Congress’ control of interstate relations.
Individual rights guarantees represent a more potent restriction on Congress, but this
is true only those guarantees that receive strong protection independent of the
interstate context.
A. The Constitutional Core of Horizontal Federalism:  State Autonomy,
State Equality, and State Territoriality
 Determining the extent to which state sovereignty limits Congress’ ability
to regulate interstate relations poses a formidable antecedent difficulty, that of
establishing the meaning of state sovereignty.  Existing federalism precedent
suggests three overlapping yet distinct principles of state sovereignty in the interstate
context:  state autonomy, state equality, and state territoriality or the requirement of
territorial limits on state authority.  All three represent basic ingredients of
federalism, and all three are clearly immanent in the New State and Guarantee
Clauses of Article IV, thereby reinforcing the point that benefits result from
considering the article as a whole.  None, however, ultimately supports robust limits
on Congress’s powers to order interstate relations.
1.  State Autonomy.  State autonomy is generally invoked to defend the states
from federal impositions, and in that context it is used to cover two very different
ideas:  the states’ own immunity from federal regulation, and their freedom to
regulate private conduct as they see fit.164  Yet state autonomy also has a less
prominent horizontal dimension, embodying the idea that each state is free to pursue
the policies it believes best, subject to constitutional requirements and federal
preemption but free from unwanted interference by its sister states.  Although largely
implicit in the Constitution, this horizontal dimension is nonetheless fundamental to
our federal order.
Fundamental though it may be, however, the principle of state autonomy does
not easily translate into constraints on congressional control over  interstate relations.
To begin with, congressional relaxation of Article IV duties seems likely to foster
state autonomy by allowing states to pursue regulatory options that are otherwise
constitutionally forbidden.  Of course, congressionally-authorized state
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fall within the core of Congress’ legitimate field of concern, see supra note 70 and accompanying text, reading
Congress’ enumerated powers narrowly to protect state autonomy against horizontal encroachment will not be
a plausible option.  For arguments in favor of greater limits on federal regulatory power on horizontal federalism
grounds, see Baker & Young, supra note 84, at 126–28.
166 See supra Part I.A.4.
167 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).  It has acknowledged, however, that
Congress can enact prophylactic measures to preserve those guarantees if an appropriate showing of need is
made.
168 Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n. 18 (1988) (plurality op.).
discrimination may result in significant burdens on other states. As a case in point,
congressional authorization of state bans on waste importation will have a substantial
economic, political, and environmental impact on states that are major waste
generators, an impact they could avoid were dormant Commerce Clause protections
in force.  But these states suffer no diminution in the scope of their constitutional
powers as a result of such congressional authorization, as their ability to export solid
wastes was always subject to direct congressional prohibition under the commerce
power.   In other words, provided Congress is acting within the scope of its
enumerated powers, state autonomy offers little defense against congressional
authorization of state discrimination.165  Indeed, it seems particularly odd to raise
state autonomy as a barrier if the alternative is for Congress itself to impose the
discrimination in question, thereby denying states the option of choosing an
antidiscriminatory approach. 
State autonomy similarly imposes few constraints on congressional expansion
of prohibitions on interstate discrimination beyond what the courts have held Article
IV to require.  As noted above, these prohibitions are independently quite substantial,
thereby suggesting that any power to discriminate against sister states and their
residents is not an important aspect of state autonomy for constitutional purposes.166
In addition, Article IV accords a breadth of congressional power over the states
greater than that expressly granted elsewhere.  Contrast to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is again instructive.  The Court has denied that Section 5
grants Congress power to expand the content of Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees.167  But it has remarked (albeit in dicta) that under the Effects Clause
“Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure of faith and credit that a
State must accord to the laws or judgments of another State.”168
Moreover, structural and normative grounds exist to support congressional
power to enlarge antidiscrimination protections.  Interstate discrimination presents
a real danger of political process failure, given the lack of direct political
representation for affected out-of-state interests.  Congress’ greater representative
status makes it better able to weigh fairly the harms particular forms of
discrimination may pose to the nation as a whole.  Allowing Congress to expand
antidiscrimination protection thus fosters the democracy reinforcing principles that
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170 469 U.S. 528, 548–55  (1985); see also Varat supra note 4, at 565–68 (arguing, prior to Garcia, that
state autonomy concerns under National League of Cities may limit Congress’ power to expand states’ privileges
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171 See, e.g., West v. Anne Arundel County, 137 F.3d 752, 760–61 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
607 (1998).
172 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
173 528 U.S. 141, 148, 151 (2000); see also Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n. 9
(2000) (federal duties still apply and can be enforced through means other than money damages). 
174 Compare, e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (upholding state’s power to limit free
public education to bona fide residents); Sosna v. Iowa 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1975) (emphasizing Iowa’s interest
in “avoiding officious intermeddling in matters in which another state has a paramount interest” in upholding
that state’s one-year durational residency requirement for filing for divorce) with Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554–56
(upholding application of FLSA notwithstanding financial costs on states), Crosby v. National Foreign Trades
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n. 8 (2000) (noting Congress can preempt state spending choices), and United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941) (holding Congress has power to regulate intrastate commerce to insure
interstate commerce is not used to foster unfair competition). 
175 528 U.S. at 146.
John Hart Ely famously argued lie immanent in constitutional structure.169  It also
fosters the Constitution’s commitment to national union.  To say that a particular
form of discrimination is not constitutionally prohibited does not guarantee it will not
spark interstate resentment and retaliation. 
In any event, congressional power to expand prohibitions on interstate
discrimination accords with current precedent.  In Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court held that, acting under its commerce
power, Congress can impose generally-applicable duties on the states, and that such
impositions are largely beyond judicial challenge.170  Notwithstanding its recent
federalism revival, the Court has not sought to reconsider Garcia directly,171 and
indeed the Court has fairly consistently sanctioned broad congressional power to
regulate the states when they are engaging in commercial activities.172   It did so
again in Reno v. Condon, its most recent decision addressing this issue, when the
Court upheld federal regulation of the commercial use of state-compiled driver
license information.173
So long as the Court formally adheres to Garcia, congressional expansion of
Article IV requirements is doctrinally unproblematic.   The rationales sometimes
given for upholding instances of state discrimination against Article IV
challenges—that the activities in question involve state spending rather than state
regulation, or the impact that one state’s regulatory scheme has on sister states—do
not distinguish congressional expansion of interstate discrimination protections from
other congressional regulation of the states.174  Reno left open whether Congress can
target the states for regulation,175 but congressional expansions of Article IV rights
seem unlikely to target the states any more than the measure restricting disclosure
of driver license information there at issue.  For example, a congressional measure
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177 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S.
371, 383 (1978); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972); Laycock, supra note 12, at 270–72
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178 For example, the constitutionality of a federal prohibition on residency requirements for public
employees who do not have policy formation or execution responsibilities is already a much closer question. 
Cf. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973). 
179 221 U.S. 559, 567, 579 (1911).
180 Id. at 573; see also Biber, supra note 60, at 124 (arguing that Congress has continued to impose
conditions that appear to violate the equal footing requirement).  For earlier statements of the equal footing
doctrine, see Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 216 (1845).  
prohibiting any institution of higher education from charging out-of-state students
a larger tuition seems as much a generally applicable statute; no doubt it is
overwhelmingly public universities that use such differential tuition rates, but it is
also overwhelmingly state motor vehicle departments that generate and sell driver
license information.176
 To be sure, some enactments seem plainly beyond the constitutional pale,
such as congressional prohibitions of all residency requirements for voting or
election to state office.  At this extreme, the Court’s insistence on preserving state
political autonomy and prohibiting federal commandeering of state legislative or
executive branches would come into play; whether or not such measures violate the
Guarantee Clause, they would severely compromise the necessary structure of a state
as a political entity representing a distinct geographical community.177  But move
even a little away from such extremes, and the proper scope of congressional power
quickly becomes murky.178  In the end, state autonomy is unlikely to erect a much of
a barrier to Congress’ powers to contract or expand the requirements of Article IV
and otherwise regulate interstate relations.
2.  State Equality.  The state equality principle, long a staple of nineteenth
century political discourse, received its most articulate judicial exposition in Coyle
v. Smith.  There the Court held that Congress lacked power to compel Oklahoma to
make the city of Guthrie its state capital for seven years as a condition of admission
into the union.179  Coyle contains the most prominent statement of the “equal footing”
doctrine, which requires that “a new state is admitted into the Union . . . with all the
powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the original states, and such
powers may not be constitutionally diminished . . . by any conditions. . . which
would not be valid and effectual if the subject of congressional legislation after
admission.”180   In justifying this doctrine the Court stated: 
‘Equality of constitutional right and power is the condition of all
states of the Union, old and new.’ 
... 
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182 See also Laycock, supra note 12, at 288 (describing state equality as a principle that “[t]he
Constitution assumes, without ever quite saying so.”); Kramer, supra note 10, at 2006 (arguing that state equality
“represents the very idea of what it means to be in a Union.”).
183 See supra Part I.B.1.
184 U.S. Const. art. I, art. V.  Other equality provisions include the prohibition of port preferences and
uniform taxation requirements of Article I.  On the other hand, Section 9 of Article I distinguishes among the
states in providing that Congress cannot prohibit “the Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit” before 1808. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (emphasis added).  This provision
could signal either that the framers accepted that new states might have lesser powers, or (by operation of the
expressio unius maxim) that in all other regards the states were to be equal.
185 For an analogous argument, see John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in Protecting
Its Own, 23 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 173, 185–91 (1981) (arguing that conflicts of law rules under which states grant
nonresidents the benefits they would receive under their home state’s law should satisfy Article IV’s Privileges
and Immunities Clause).
186 Laycock, supra note 12, at 250.
[T]he constitutional equality of the states is essential to the
harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was
organized.  When that equality disappears we may be a free people,
but the Union will not be the Union of the Constitution.181
Although rhetorically powerful, Coyle offered little by way of constitutional
analysis to support its conclusion that states must be admitted on equal terms, and
the absence of any such equality demand in the text of the New State Clause—an
intentional absence at that—might give pause.   Nonetheless, Coyle’s intuition
appears correct.182  While the New State Clause does not expressly require that states
enter on equal terms, the restrictions it imposes on Congress’ ability to carve up or
consolidate existing states embody state equality concerns.  So, too, does the Effect
Clause’s requirement that Congress must act by means of “general laws.”183  The
Constitution contains other manifestations of state equality concerns in regard to
Congress, the strongest perhaps being the requirement of equal representation in the
Senate, a structural feature critical to the Constitution’s adoption and the only
constitutional provision that is formally unalterable.184 
But the principle of state equality, like state autonomy, fails to justify robust
limits on Congress’ powers to authorize state discrimination in violation of Article
IV.   Most significantly, interstate discrimination does not necessarily lead to state
inequality.185  Douglas Laycock and Larry Kramer disagree, arguing that in the
conflict of laws context state equality means that “[s]tates must treat sister states as
equal in authority to themselves.”186 In their view, a state must apply sister state law
regardless of its view of the law’s merits, and therefore the established doctrine that
a state may reject sister state law that offends its strong public policy is
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not violate the uniformity requirement he believes attaches to Congress under the commerce power.   Although
the net result is a nonuniform regulatory system across the nation as a whole, such congressional authorization
of state regulation itself treats all the states uniformly.   Colby, supra note 24, at 314–17.
189 See Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468 (1982); Secretary of
Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616, (1950); see also Coyle, 221 U.S. at 568, 570
(indicating that Congress can impose ongoing conditions on new states when the conditions rest not on the New
State Clause but on Congress’ regulatory powers).  Tom Colby has attacked this precedent as actually at odds
with original understanding, and argued that at least measures facially distinguishing among the states should
be subject to more searching scrutiny.   Colby, supra note 24, at 301–04, 311–12, 339.
190 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985); see also South Carolina
v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512–13 (1988) (rejecting political process failure claim, noting that “South Carolina has
not even alleged . . .that it was singled out in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless.”); Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332–33 (1981) (rejecting equality claims against surface mining scheme that impacted
more harshly on Midwest mining operations).
191 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2213 n.38 (2005).
unconstitutional.187  This is unconvincing; if all states retain equal authority to reject
sister state law on public policy grounds, in what sense are they systematically
unequal?188
This leaves the possibility that measures singling out a particular states for
distinct treatment might violate state equality requirements.  Notably, however, the
text of the Commerce Clause does not impose such a uniformity requirement on
Congress, and the Court has stated that Congress can instead subject the states to
distinct regulatory regimes.189  It is even more clear that Congress can enact measures
that, though facially uniform, have a disproportionate burden on some states, at least
absent substantial evidence of “failings in the national political process.”190  As the
Court recently noted, to allow state regulatory choices to limit Congress in the
exercise of its enumerated powers “would turn the Supremacy Clause on its head”
and reflects a dual federalism model “long since . . . rejected.”191  Moreover, it is
hard to see why state equality would prevent Congress from choosing to allow other
states to discriminate against a disfavored policy, rather than preempting it directly;
after all, the former approach at least allows states adhering to the disfavored view
to continue to do so within their own borders. 
The situation is somewhat different when Congress is legislating under its
Effects Clause power, given the latter’s “general laws” requirement.  As discussed
above, that requirement is best understood as imposing a uniformity requirement, and
thus precludes Congress from facially distinguishing among the states, even if it can
do so under the commerce power.  But again, disproportionate impact on particular
states should not prevent Congress from adopting measures that otherwise satisfy the
Effects Clause’s requirements.  Nor, finally, do grounds exist to conclude that state
equality mandates that Congress use its Effects Clause power to legislate in a value-
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note , at 243–45.
194 This assumes, as do most scholars, see, e.g., Cox, supra note 3, at 391; Laycock, supra note 4, at
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195 See Richard Briffault, What About the “Ism”?, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1335–38 (1994)
(emphasizing importance of Article IV’s territorial guarantee).
196 See Donald Regan, Siamese Essays: (1) CTS Corp v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1865, 1884–96 (1987).
197 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003); see also BMW v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (“[I]t follows from . . . principles of state sovereignty and comity that a State may not
impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct
in other States.”)  For a critique of the Court’s reliance on extraterritoriality to limit punitive damages awards,
see generally Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages, and State Sovereignty, 13 Geo. Mason
L. Rev. 1 (2004).  But see Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 13, at 176–79.
neutral fashion.192  No such demand of value-neutrality applies to Congress’ other
powers or appears on the face of the Clause.  In the end, the strongest argument for
greater scrutiny of congressional value choices under the Effects Clause lies not in
state equality but instead, as in the case of Coyle, in a vertical federalism fear that
Congress might otherwise evade substantive limits on its enumerated powers under
Article I.  This presumes, however, that unlike Congress’ other Article IV powers,193
the Effect Clause grants no substantive authority on its own.  But the Effects
Clause’s text supports a broader view; moreover, this reading renders the Clause
redundant, for Congress could only alter the extent of full faith and credit states must
provide in areas that already come under its Article I authority.194 
3.  State Territoriality.  State territoriality is a third state sovereignty limit
warranting consideration.  The principle that states are territorially-bound polities
permeates the Constitution and finds explicit textual manifestation in the New State
Clause’s protection of an existing state’s territory.195  The principle is most
frequently encountered as a prohibition on extraterritorial state legislation.  Perceived
efforts by the states to regulate the legal consequences of actions occurring outside
their borders often provoke strong judicial condemnation on federalism grounds.196
Most recently, in the punitive damages context, the Court insisted that “[a] state
cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred.
. . . A basic principle of federalism is that each State may make its own reasoned
judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its borders.”197
Similarly, in cases arising under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court has stated
that “‘any attempt directly to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or
property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the State’s
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statute to Florida citizen even if offense took place upon the high seas).   
power.’”198  To some extent, the extraterritoriality prohibition is more of a specific
application of the principles of state autonomy and state equality than a distinct
restriction in its own right; part of the problem with extraterritorial state legislation
is that it gives the enacting state elevated authority over its sisters and denies these
other states power to set policy within their borders.199
But inferring a limit on Congress from the extraterritorial prohibition is quite
another matter.  To begin with, the content of the prohibition on the states themselves
should not be overstated.  In practice states exert regulatory control over each other
all the time.  Perhaps the most prominent instance is Delaware’s corporate law,
which has de facto nationwide application due to the number of major companies
incorporated there.200  So, too, do California’s automobile emission standards.201  The
prohibition on extraterritorial legislation is thus understood only to constrain a state
from formally asserting legal authority outside its borders.  Even in this form,
however, the prohibition is hardly absolute.  On occasion, the Court has accepted
states’ formal assertions of authority over individuals and activities outside their
borders, the most salient example being the Court’s switch from strong territorial
limits on state assertions of personal jurisdiction to a minimum contacts and
fundamental fairness approach.202  Underlying these seeming inconsistencies is the
Court’s realization that a state’s geographic territory does not mark the outer limit
of its legitimate regulatory concern.  In our federal system, which combines state
regulatory control with a national market and interstate mobility, some
extraterritoriality is not only inevitable, but appropriate.  
Against this background, it would be odd indeed were Congress not to enjoy
some additional leeway to authorize extraterritorial state regulation.  Navigating the
border between a state’s legitimate regulation and illegitimate intrusion on sister
states is precisely the type of interstate relations question over which Congress
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should have paramount authority.  Indeed, extraterritoriality prohibitions imposed
under the dormant Commerce Clause are presumably within the control of Congress,
just like other dormant Commerce Clause restrictions.  Moreover, the Effects Clause,
in granting Congress the power to determine the effect that one state’s laws will have
in others, by its terms allows Congress to mandate extraterritoriality.203
Of course, some measures may be beyond Congress’ powers because they
represent too great a compromise of a state’s independence from, and equality with,
its sister states.  Congress cannot grant Texas direct legislative authority over the
territory of Massachusetts and individuals therein, even if so doing might resolve
interstate tensions sparked by a blue state’s liberal social policies.  Indeed, any
formal displacement of one state’s regulatory control over its territory in favor of
another state (as opposed to authorizing that the second state’s regulation shall apply
in some circumstances as well) arguably may transcend Congress’ powers.204  But
such extreme measures are highly unlikely to win congressional approval in any
event.
More significantly, the extraterritoriality prohibition is rooted in due process
and individual rights protections as well as federalism.  The prohibition’s appearance
in recent punitive damages decisions, for example, came in the course of the Court’s
elucidation of due process limits on such damages; restrictions on a state’s ability to
assert personal jurisdiction similarly have a due process basis.205  In addition, a
state’s efforts to regulate its citizens’ extraterritorial actions is often attacked as
unconstitutionally burdening their right to travel.206  Thus, the extent to which
Congress can authorize extraterritorial legislation implicates the separate question
discussed below:  Whether—and if so, how—congressional power over interstate
relations is limited when Article IV implicates individual rights.
B. Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment
1.  Congressional Power and Individual Rights.   Up to now, the discussion
has treated Article IV primarily as a provision that regulates interstate relations.  But,
of course, Article IV is not just about interstate relations, it is also about individual
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211 Cohen, Enigma, supra note 4, at 388, 406, 411–13.
rights.  This is clearest in regard to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which by
its terms prohibits states from discriminating against another state’s “citizens.”207  To
the extent that Article IV is seen as an individual rights guarantee, the case for a
revisory congressional power seems intuitively more problematic.208  Central to our
contemporary idea of constitutional rights is a conviction that they represent
restrictions on government that the political organs ordinarily lack ability to
disregard.209  If constitutional rights turned simply on the political branches’
willingness to recognize them, they would differ little from the protections afforded
by  positive law.210  Here, the distinction between Article IV expansion and
contraction appears a significant one.  Whatever Congress’ powers to expand Article
IV’s requirements beyond judicial interpretations, allowing Congress to authorize
interstate discrimination that otherwise would be held to violate Article IV appears
fundamentally at odds with our understanding of constitutional rights.
One response is to argue that, because the individual rights secured by Article
IV take the form of restrictions on state conduct, they are irrelevant to assessing
Congress’ powers.  William Cohen, a forceful advocate of this view, argues that
Congress is free to authorize state violations of constitutional rights whenever
“Congress is not constitutionally prohibited from directly adopting the same policy
itself.”211  Supporting Cohen is the Hohfeldian insight that rights describe
relationships.  They run against particular individuals or institutions; they are not
freefloating entities that can be asserted against interference, regardless of its
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source.212  Cohen is also right that Article IV’s failure to expressly impose its
antidiscrimination provisions on Congress is instructive; as noted, this silence
reinforces the structural implication that Congress has broad power over interstate
relations.  
In the end, however, this argument puts too much weight on Article IV’s
textual silence regarding Congress.  Cohen himself acknowledges that the Court
elsewhere has rejected the claim that textual silence is dispositive of the question
whether constitutional rights apply against the federal government.  One analogy
concerns the Contracts Clause of Article I’s Section 10;  although the Contracts
Clause expressly applies only to the states, the Court has read a similar, albeit
perhaps more deferential, prohibition against Congress into the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.213  At bottom, the question is whether the Court should treat
Article IV’s protections in a parallel fashion.  Prigg, Dennison, and Coyle further
reject the proposition that Article IV’s silence is determinative of the scope of
Congress’ power under Article IV. 
In addition, an unqualified claim that Congress has power to authorize state
violations of any rights to which it is not directly subject fails in structural terms.
What distinguishes the federal and state governments is their different composition,
powers, and responsibilities.  As the political representative of the nation, Congress
can claim a special responsibility for discerning and acting upon the national interest,
and the powers granted to it often relate to subjects that intuitively require national
treatment—interstate commerce, immigration and naturalization, foreign affairs, and
so on.  It is Congress’ special expertise and stature as the representative of the
national interest that explains the constitutional model described above, one in which
constitutional default rules imposing obligations on the states in the name of union
are ultimately subject to congressional control.  Congress also regularly creates and
limits individual statutory rights in the course of exercising its enumerated powers,
and the Section 5 power indicates that Congress has some responsibility for ensuring
that Fourteenth Amendment rights are realized.  The structural basis for
congressional authority to limit individual constitutional rights is, however,
considerably less evident.   In that context, Congress’ own majoritarian and political
status makes it an unreliable stand-in for the interests of individuals claiming rights
against the similarly majoritarian and political branches of state government.214
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For these reasons, the question of Congress’ power to authorize state
violations of Article IV rights is more difficult than Cohen acknowledges.  But the
contrary view, that Congress lacks power to contract Article IV’s interstate
requirements whenever they take the form of individual rights guarantees, ignores
the fact that Article IV has a core interstate dimension and that Congress can
legitimately claim broad authority regarding interstate matters.  At a minimum, some
account is needed to show why the arguments supporting broad congressional power
over interstate relations become irrelevant once the article’s individual rights
dimension is acknowledged.  Such an account is particularly important because, if
adopted, this view would seem to force a reconsideration of Congress’ well-
established power to authorize state violations of the dormant Commerce Clause, at
least with respect to individuals.215 
More basically, the view that the individual rights character of Article IV’s
guarantees removes them from congressional control is based on a false premise.
Congressional power to limit the scope of individual rights is not in fact an alien
concept in our constitutional order.  In some instances, constitutional rights are
treated as fundamental and the views of the political branches given little weight.216
In others, however—economic and social rights being the prime example—both
federal and state governments have broad authority to determine what constitutional
protections will mean in practice.  True, the Supreme Court retains formal control
over determining whether a particular regulatory measure is constitutional, but the
standard of review it employs—“is there any reasonably conceivable set of facts that
could provide a rational basis” for the legislation?217—is so deferential that as a
practical matter it allows the political branches to control the operative significance
of the rights at stake.  If Congress has such power over the shape of some other
constitutional rights, why should the Article IV guarantees, which at their core are
also matters of interstate relations, be categorically free from congressional control?
2.  Congressional Power, Article IV, and the Fourteenth Amendment.  This
suggests that the question of Congress’ power to revise Article IV’s interstate
requirements cannot be answered simply by treating these requirements as a
homogenous whole, and instead turns on the particular provision at stake.  One
particularly salient factor is the extent to which an Article IV requirement takes the
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form of an individual rights guarantee that applies independently of the interstate
context.  The structural argument above supports granting Congress broad power to
contract or expand any Article IV requirement centered upon the interstate arena,
even if the requirement takes the form of a claim of individual right.  But when an
individual right carries constitutional significance wholly independent of the
interstate context, Congress’ power is necessarily more limited.  In these instances,
the congressional role in interstate relations may support allowing Congress to
expand the requirement beyond its fundamental core, but not contract it. 
This distinction might appear unmanageable and too difficult to implement,
as it requires close analysis of the meaning of each Article IV right.  A little
reflection, however, makes clear that the distinction is essentially equivalent to
saying that Congress’ power over Article IV’s interstate demands is subject to the
limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The reason is that Article IV requirements
with such independent constitutional significance will be accorded substantial
protection directly under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Subjecting Congress to the
Fourteenth Amendment seems odd at first blush, given the extent to which that
provision speaks only to action by the states.  Yet the Court has repeatedly held that
Section 5’s grant to Congress of power to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment
means Congress cannot authorize violations of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.218
Some commentators contend that Congress should enjoy greater ability to deviate
from judicial interpretations of Fourteenth Amendment rights in exercising its
Section 5 power than the Court currently allows.219  Even so, Section 5’s “enforce”
limitation would appear to preclude Congress from significantly contracting the
scope of judicially-recognized Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Moreover, most
(though not necessarily all) Fourteenth Amendment rights receiving strong
protection also apply directly to Congress through the Fifth Amendment, providing
an additional independent barrier to congressional authorization of their violation.220
Arguably, the point can even be pushed further, to the broader claim that it
is mistaken to view Article IV as a rights-creating provision in the first instance.
Instead, notwithstanding that some of its clauses speak in individual rights terms, the
article should be viewed solely as a structural provision, targeted at the interstate
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relationship.221  This is not meant to suggest any fundamental dichotomy between
structural and individual rights provisions222 or that individuals should not be able
to assert Article IV rights in litigation.  Structural provisions regularly accrue to the
benefit of individuals, and were intended to do so by the framers.223  But recognizing
the primarily structural character of Article IV helps clarify that individual rights
emanating from it are best viewed as contingent and congressionally displaceable.
Article IV rights that intuitively resist such contingent status are better reformulated
as resting on a constitutional basis independent of that article, specifically the
Fourteenth Amendment.
It might seem anomalous to distinguish in this fashion between Congress’
powers under Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment.224  In fact, however, such
a disjunction is fully warranted.  As discussed above, textual restrictions on Congress
akin to Section 5’s “enforce” language are much harder to infer from Article IV’s
terms.225  But a distinction regarding congressional power in these two contexts
would exist even if the Fourteenth Amendment did not contain Section 5.  Critically,
the Fourteenth Amendment lacks the interstate relations focus of Article IV.  Its
animating concern was the relationship between a state and its citizens, as well as
with others within its boundaries.  Yet Article IV’s interstate dimension is of course
precisely what justifies congressional power to contract its requirements.  Existing
doctrine supports the distinction between Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment
as well.  Under recent decisions, Congress’ commerce power is clearly of greater
substantive scope than its Section 5 power.  At the same time that the Court has
emphasized limitations on Congress’ power to expand the scope of Fourteenth
Amendment rights when acting under Section 5, it has underscored Congress’ ability
to do so when acting under the Commerce Clause.226 The greater substantive breadth
of the commerce power is especially significant here, given that Congress
overwhelmingly utilizes the commerce power when it regulates interstate relations.
Distinguishing between Congress’ powers under Article IV and the
Fourteenth Amendment also accords with the Court’s recent decision in Saenz v.
Roe.  Saenz is a particularly important decision to consider in parsing the relationship
between Article IV and Fourteenth Amendment rights, in part because it involved a
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person’s right to travel interstate, a right that is perhaps unique in being intrinsically
linked to both interstate relations and individual liberty.227  Moreover, in Saenz the
Court linked the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV with its companion
clause in Fourteenth Amendment, describing both as sources of the right to travel
and reiterating that Congress lacks power to authorize state violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court thus underscored the individual rights aspect of
Article IV guarantees and could be read to suggest that Congress lacks power to
authorize violations of Article IV guarantees as well.228  On the other hand, the Court
also noted that the Article IV component of the right to travel, “the right to be treated
like a welcome visitor,” is subject to greater qualification than the component it
identified as rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment, “the right to be treated like other
citizens of that State” where one “elects to become [a] permanent resident.”229 In
short, Saenz simultaneously both linked and differentiated between Article IV and
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Moreover, the reason Saenz noted for distinguishing
between the right to travel protections under these provisions is that “[p]ermissible
justifications for discrimination between residents and nonresidents are simply
inapplicable to a nonresident’s exercise of the right to move into another State and
become a resident.”230  By thus suggesting that these two constitutional provisions
cannot simply be equated despite their shared concerns, and further that the interstate
dimension of Article IV is what may justify different treatment, Saenz offers some
support for the approach advocated here. 
An effort to distinguish among different Article IV guarantees only works,
however, if state classifications between residents and nonresidents do not receive
searching scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
Otherwise, the distinction drawn between rights tied to the interstate context and
rights having significance independent of that context (and protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment) collapses.  With one arguable exception, the Court’s
caselaw is consistent with this rule.  Although the Court has on occasion invalidated
resident-nonresident classifications on equal protection grounds, it has held that for
equal protection purposes such classifications are not inherently suspect and trigger
only rationality review.231  As all government action must survive that level of
review, this means that a state residence classification in theory adds nothing special
to this undemanding species of equal protection analysis. 
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The arguable exception is Metropolitan Insurance Life Insurance Company
v. Ward.232  There, over sharp dissent, the Court ruled invalid, on equal protection
grounds, an Alabama statute that taxed out-of-state insurance companies at a rate
higher than those incorporated and having their principal place of business within the
state.233  Ward, however, is a seriously flawed decision.  Among other criticisms, its
characterization of a state’s desire to foster local business as nothing more than
improper parochialism conflicts with numerous instances in which the Court has
upheld this interest as plainly legitimate.234  Nor did the Court provide a satisfying
account of why congressional authorization of the discriminatory taxes at issue in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act did not immunize them against equal protection challenges
as well as dormant Commerce Clause challenges.235  In any event, in reaching its
result the Ward majority claimed to apply ordinary rationality review and also
emphasized that Congress did “not purport to limit in any way the applicability of
the Equal Protection Clause” to state regulation of insurance.236  As a result, the legal
standard invoked by Ward comports with the approach advocated here, under which
“[a]ny federalism component of equal protection is fully vindicated where Congress
has explicitly authorized a parochial focus.”237   
III.  APPLICATIONS
A brief restatement seems in order.  The constitutional model for interstate
relations is one of strong judicially-enforceable antidiscrimination requirements, but
analysis shows that in fact these are default requirements, subject to congressional
revision.  Institutionally, Congress is best positioned to determine the national
interest and the need for state restrictions; moreover, the aggrandizement concerns
that dominate vertical federalism disputes are substantially reduced in the horizontal
federalism context.  Recognition of broad congressional power is at least consistent
with (and in some aspects clearly supported by) Article IV’s text and history.  Core
federalism postulates of state autonomy, state equality, and state territoriality yield
few restrictions on Congress in this arena, barring only the most extreme forms of
congressional regulation.  Instead, the major limit on Congress, and potentially a
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quite significant one, is that Congress cannot authorize state violations of rights
independently guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
What remains is to explore how the approach articulated here would operate
in practice, an important exercise given the necessarily abstract quality of some of
the preceding discussion.  The goal of this part is to do so, by applying this approach
to instances of congressional legislation affecting the states’ obligations under
Article IV’s Full Faith and Credit and Privileges and Immunities Clauses.  DOMA
and CIANA are two obvious measures to consider under the proposed analysis, since
each represents an actual congressional effort to alter otherwise existing state
obligations under these clauses.  Each measure can be challenged as bad policy.  In
addition, each may be found to violate the Fifth Amendment, even if each otherwise
would fall within Congress’ power over interstate relations.  The question addressed
here, however, is simply whether the acts indeed do fall within Congress’ interstate
relations authority.  Examined under the proposed analysis, the answer is largely yes.
A.  DOMA and Congress’ Power Under the Effects Clause
Section 2 of DOMA provides: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.238
Section 2’s purpose, evident from its terms, was to ensure that states would not be
required to recognize same sex marriage by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Under traditional choice of law principles, however, a state could refuse
recognition to marriages performed elsewhere that violate its fundamental public
policies.  Accordingly, even absent DOMA, a state’s refusal to recognize a same-sex
marriage was unlikely to violate Article IV’s full faith and credit demand, at least as
applied to a same-sex marriage involving state residents.239  But Section 2 does
deviate from existing doctrine by authorizing states to refuse to recognize sister state
judgments respecting a same-sex marriage, especially final money judgments.
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(describing current doctrine on the full faith and credit due judgments).
242  See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–16 (2000).
243  Insofar as a same-sex marriage is invoked in connection with economic benefits, such as claims
for health insurance, the Commerce Clause might well apply.  Congress , however,identified the Effects Clause
as the basis for enactment of DOMA’s Section 2.  H.R. Rep. 664, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. at 24–26.
244 Moreover, DOMA was enacted in 1996, prior to Massachusetts’ recognition of same-sex marriage
and in response to the since-repealed protection of homosexuals’ right to marry under Hawaii’s Constitution.
245 See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra notes 92–94, 192–194 and accompanying text.
Ordinarily, the public policy exception is limited to sister state laws.240  As the Court
recently remarked, “the full faith and credit command is exacting with respect to a
final judgment rendered by a court with full adjudicatory authority over the subject
matter and persons governed by the judgment.”241  Even if Section 2 does contract
the requirements of full faith and credit, however, it would not for that reason be
outside Congress’ powers under the approach outlined here.  
The Court frequently identifies marriage and domestic relations as areas
outside of federal commerce power control.242  Whether nonetheless the commerce
power could support some applications of DOMA’s Section 2 is a nice question but
one unnecessary to address, because Congress has power to enact Section 2 under
Article IV’s Effects Clause.243  Although DOMA has a discriminatory aspect for
Massachusetts alone, Section 2 on its face does not single out any particular state for
disfavored treatment; its target is instead same-sex marriage.244  And absent the
unjustified assumption of all marriages as a constitutionally-mandated baseline, the
category of all same-sex marriages appears sufficiently general for Effects Clause
purposes.245  
 Plainly, DOMA reflects Congress’ substantive opposition to same-sex
marriage.  But that Congress is seeking to advance its own substantive agenda in an
area traditionally reserved for the states does not render DOMA beyond its Effects
Clause powers, provided that the Act can be seen as a reasonable effort to further the
national interest in interstate harmony and union.246   That Section 2 of DOMA meets
this standard seems clear, given the extent of national debate and contention over
same sex marriage and the fact that forty states recently have added statutory or
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249 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818–19 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
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significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,” Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312–13, the level of contacts
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presence is unrelated to the subject matter of the suit).
251 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Face of Property, 86 Va. L Rev. 885, 960–67 (2000)
(identifying these three features as core aspects of property for due process purposes); Kirk v. Denver Publ. Co.,
818 P.2d 262, 267 (Colo. 1991) (holding that a judgment for exemplary damages is a constitutionally-protected
property interest).  Judgments providing equitable relief raise more complicated issues, but some forms of
injunctive or declaratory relief—those entitling the beneficiary to ongoing services or treatment with clear
monetary value, for example—seem similarly akin to property.  
constitutional prohibitions against recognizing such marriages.247  Whether or not
state fears that they would be forced to recognize same-sex marriages absent DOMA
were justified, these fears themselves could lead to interstate strife.248
DOMA’s Section 2 thus represents a rational regulation of interstate relations
that accords with the terms of the Effects Clause and principles of federalism.  Under
the approach advanced here, therefore, its constitutionality turns on the intersection
of full faith and credit and the Fourteenth Amendment.  The full faith and credit
distinction between laws and judgments is mirrored in Fourteenth Amendment due
process precedent.  Under current full faith and credit doctrine, a forum state is
required to apply another state’s law only if it itself lacks sufficient contacts to
legislate regarding the subject matter at issue.  This is essentially the same standard
that due process imposes, and the Court has made clear that the demands imposed by
full faith and credit and due process on state choice of law rules are often
equivalent.249  The Fourteenth Amendment thus offers little impediment to DOMA’s
Section 2 as applied to choice of law, because it will be rare that a state cannot claim
the minimal contacts demanded in regard to a case brought in its own courts.250
Applied to recognition of final judgments, however, the matter is different.
Many judgments appear analogous to property, thereby receiving significant
protection under Fourteenth Amendment due process:  They grant a judicially-
enforceable entitlement to benefits that, at least in the case of money damages, have
an ascertainable monetary value and are not subject to discretionary termination.251
Indeed, money judgments arguably qualify as property under the Takings Clause as
well, given a government’s limited ability to terminate or refuse to recognize a
judgment, particularly one it has issued.  Nor is it difficult to envision instances when
an individual might sue to enforce a judgment that involves a same-sex marriage—for
example, a judgment that an insurer is liable to cover the costs of medical procedures
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253 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
254 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 n.6 (1981) (holding that President did not effect
a taking in nullifying petitioner’s attachment against Iranian assets to enforce a judgment because the attachment
was obtained clearly subject to the president’s power of revocation and thus “petitioner did not acquire any sort
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that they obtained a judgment initially with the expectation of purely domestic enforcement but circumstances
changed.  See Cox, supra note 3, at 397 (providing example of a lifelong Massachusetts same-sex couple who
divorce and obtain a judgment dividing their financial assets, and then one former spouse moves out-of-state).
255 See, e.g.,Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
326–27, 330-31, 342 (2002) (insisting that absent physical occupation or obliteration of all economically
beneficial use, the appropriate analysis is to assess whether a taking has occurred by assessing the impact a
regulation has on the property as a whole, not just that aspect directly affected).
256 These issues go beyond the scope of this article.  For arguments that DOMA is unconstitutional on
these grounds, see, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case for Same-Sex Marriage (1996); Koppelman, DOMA,
supra note 10, at 4–9, 25–32; see also Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that a right for same-sex couples to marry follows from the decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003)).
under a health insurance policy covering spouses.252  DOMA’s Section 2 clearly
allows states to refuse to recognize judgments of this sort, not simply in its retraction
of full faith and credit for records and judicial proceedings, but further in stipulating
that “[n]o state . . . shall be required to give effect to . . . a right or claim arising from
[a same-sex] relationship.”253
As a result, Section 2’s application to judgments appears more problematic,
although in the end even here the statute appears to fall within Congress’ powers.
Critically, DOMA was in place before any state recognized same-sex marriage, and
thus before any judgments relating to same-sex marriages arose.  That makes proving
reliance on out-of-state recognition and enforcement difficult.  Lack of such reliance,
however, undermines the claim that a state’s refusal to recognize and enforce such an
out-of-state judgment constitutes a deprivation of property without due process or
constitutes a taking for which compensation is due under the Fourteenth
Amendment.254  A takings claim would be difficult to assert in any event, unless the
effect of DOMA’s Section 2 was to make such judgments for all intents and purposes
unenforceable,255 but the continued availability of enforcement in the state of
issuances makes that unlikely in most cases.
Of course, the fact that a same-sex marriage is involved may be an
unconstitutional basis for denying a judgment’s enforcement, because it constitutes
invidious discrimination against homosexuals or violates the fundamental right to
marry.  Similar claims could be raised against DOMA as a whole.    Thus, separate
from whether it authorizes state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, DOMA
may be unconstitutional because it violates the due process and equal protection
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.256  These issues bracketed, however, under the
analysis proposed here DOMA’s Section 2 appears to fall within Congress’ powers.
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259 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205–09 (2005); Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 206,
at 489. 
B. CIANA and Congress’ Power Over Article IV Privileges and
Immunities.
 CIANA would enact substantial restrictions on a minor’s access to out-of-
state abortions.  Section 2 of the act would make it a federal crime, and a basis for
civil liability, to “knowingly transport[] a minor across a State line, with the intent
that such minor obtain an abortion, and thereby in fact abridge[] the right of a parent
under a law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, in force
in the State where the minor resides.”257  CIANA’s Section 2 thus represents a
congressional effort to authorize state regulation of activities undertaken by its
residents outside its borders.  What CIANA does not contain is also interesting.
Specifically, CIANA does not include authorization for states to impose restrictions
on abortion applicable only to out-of-state minors, such as a notification requirement
only for such interstate abortions.  Instead, in another section of the act, Congress
itself prohibits physicians from performing abortions on minors from out-of-state
without providing 24 hour constructive notice to one of the minor’s parents.  These
notice and delay requirements apply regardless of whether the minor’s home state, or
the state where the abortion is performed, otherwise demand parental notification or
impose a waiting period.  The only way for a state to forestall application of these
requirements is to enact a parental notification law that meets Congress’ minimum
standards.258  
Like DOMA, CIANA falls within the scope of Congress’ powers, unless it
authorizes state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment or itself violates an
independent constitutional prohibition.  Although CIANA’s Section 2 is facially
focused on a state’s relationship to its own residents, it is at its core an interstate
relations measure; its underlying impetus is to protect states from having their
regulatory schemes undermined by residents’ ability to engage in interstate travel.
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has power to prohibit particular uses of the
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and the purchase of abortion
services—like many activities residents undertake in other states—come under the
rubric of economic activity.259  This is not to deny that, from a vertical federalism
perspective, CIANA’s imposition of mandatory federal notification and delay
requirements on interstate abortions is extraordinary, particularly given that abortion
regulation and familial relationships are areas traditionally left for state control.  In
addition, these federal requirements seem likely to prove quite burdensome and may
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has arisen regarding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act and the federal partial birth abortion ban.
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262 Lea Brillmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, The Right to Life, and the Right to Die,
91 Mich. L. Rev. 873, 887 (1993).
263 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 138 (1872); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 59–60 n.
2 (1982); see also Mark Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 855, 897–13 (2002).  This result is not required by the Clause’s text, however.  See Seth Kreimer,
Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 973, 1003 (2002).
independently violate the Fifth Amendment.260  That possibility aside, the interstate
commerce aspects of the activity regulated by CIANA would seem to put the measure
squarely within Congress’ commerce power.261 Moreover, state regulation of
residents’ out-of-state activities also represents a choice of law issue—the question
being which state’s law should apply to govern residents’ out-of-state activities, that
of the residents’ home state or that of the states where the activities occurred.  Thus,
Congress has power to enact Section 2 of CIANA under the Effects Clause as well.
Nor does the fact that Section 2 of CIANA authorizes extraterritorial state
regulation suffice to put it outside congressional authority.  As discussed above, to the
extent the prohibition on state extraterritorial legislation rests on considerations of
horizontal federalism and the needs of national union, it should be subject to
congressional override.  Indeed, it is by no means clear that all state efforts to regulate
their residents’ out-of-state activities are unconstitutional even absent congressional
authorization.  A state’s ongoing relationship with its residents is in some contexts
deemed sufficient to sustain its regulatory power over those residents wherever they
are located; thus, for example, the law of the resident or domiciliary state is generally
assumed to govern family law matters.262  Perhaps most importantly, state regulation
of residents’ out-of-state activities does not technically fall within the scope of Article
IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, which the Court has held “has no application
to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained of.”263  
That said, a state’s regulation of its residents’ extraterritorial activities is
certainly a practical intrusion on their Article IV right to travel to other states and be
treated the same as that states’ residents.   As Seth Kreimer has argued, “[a] system
of personal law that empowered the home state to permit travel but to deny its object
would undercut this liberty of movement just as surely as would a refusal on the part
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268 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985).
269 See, e.g., Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 102 (finding product liability system burdens interstate commerce); Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 2006,
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of the host state to allow newcomers to take advantage of local laws.”264   Regulation
of  residents’ out-of-state activities is also in tension with aspects of the right to travel
aside from the Article IV right to be a welcome visitor.  Most significantly. while such
regulation does not erect a physical barrier to residents’ ability to enter and leave the
territory of their home states, it does prevent them from leaving their states viewed
incorporeally as legal jurisdictions.  Instead, residents must carry their states’ laws
with them wherever they go.265 
Of course, even if CIANA does implicate the right to travel, the question of
Congress’ power remains.  Framed in the terms of the approach advocated here, do
all manifestations of the right to travel receive strong Fourteenth Amendment
protection such as would preclude such congressional regulation?  Certainly, some
do, whether because they constitute part of the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship or simply represent fundamental aspects of individual liberty.266
According comprehensive Fourteenth Amendment protection to all exercises of the
right to travel, however, would unduly limit Congress’ authority over interstate
relations.267  
To take an example:  In Supreme Court v. Piper the Court held that state-
imposed residency requirements for membership in a state bar violate Article IV’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause.268  Exercising the commerce power, however,
Congress should be able to authorize states to impose such bar residency
requirements.  Although traditionally an area for state regulation and often involving
intrastate conduct, lawyering is a form of economic activity that readily falls within
the scope of the commerce power.  In addition, the provision of legal services plainly
has an impact on interstate commerce, as recent debates over product liability,
medical malpractice, and securities fraud litigation demonstrate.269  Of particular
significance, while fundamental for Article IV purposes, the right to engage in
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economic activity has far more limited status outside of the interstate context.
Instead, under the Fourteenth Amendment, economic regulations trigger the mildest
forms of rationality review.270  Nor does a residency requirement for employment
have any effect on the right to travel separate from its impact on an individual’s
ability to engage in economic activity.  
The point thus has general application:  Congress should have broad power
to narrow or enlarge application of privileges and immunities protections against
state regulation of economic activity by nonresident individuals.  This is an area
where congressional and not judicial determinations should hold sway.  Of course,
some limits exist.  Congressional authorization of a wholesale and permanent ban on
nonresidents working in a state may, inter alia, come too close to dismantling the
nation, given the strong historical and practical connections between economic and
political union.271  
In addition, Congress may lack power to authorize state discrimination when
the economic activity at issue implicates fundamental rights that receive independent
Fourteenth Amendment protection.   An example here concerns state bans on
nonresident women obtaining abortions within its borders, held unconstitutional in
Doe v. Bolten.  While Congress should be able to authorize state violations of
residency requirements of the Piper variety, affecting only ordinary economic
activity, its ability to authorize violations of Doe’s ban on residency requirements for
abortion is far more dubious.272  This is in part because the state discrimination at
issue may itself violate the Fourteenth Amendment.273  But it is also because the
ability to enjoy constitutionally protected freedoms without formal limitation based
on state of residence is arguably one of the privileges of national citizenship that
Congress cannot authorize states to abridge.  To be sure, that a right is
constitutionally protected does not mean it is necessarily free from state-imposed
burdens or restrictions.  And in some circumstances, residency restrictions on access
to fundamental rights are legitimate; states can, for instance, refuse to grant the right
to vote to nonresidents.274  Thus, perhaps a state could legitimately prohibit
nonresidents from obtaining abortions at state facilities, in order to ensure such
facilities were available to resident women.275  As a general matter, however,
restrictions on fundamental constitutional rights based on state of residency seem
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incompatible with the character of such rights as guaranteed by the national charter
to all.
As a result, assessing the constitutionality of congressional authorization of
state residency restrictions requires determining whether the specific aspect of the
right to travel at issue receives strong Fourteenth Amendment protection.  In the case
of CIANA’s Section 2, that aspect is the right to travel and escape one’s home state’s
jurisdiction, at least to the extent of undertaking activities that are lawful in the state
where performed.  Intuitively, freedom to travel to other states and take advantage
of their legal regimes is part of individual liberty and national citizenship in a
federated nation.276  The Court has signaled a similar view when it has condemned,
on due process grounds, legislation that seeks to penalize activities lawful in the
states where committed.277  True, individuals are free to leave a state and establish
residency in states with more conducive laws, but that does not mean states have the
ability to put their residents to such a choice.  Moreover, denying individuals any
protection short of relocating to another state seems insufficiently responsive to
legitimate due process concerns raised by some forms of extraterritorial regulation.
Nor does a robust account of what it means to be a state resident fit well with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, which makes state citizenship
automatic and preempts the states’ power to choose their citizens.  It seems
somewhat incongruous to hold that a state has power to force its residents to carry
its laws with them wherever they go, when it lacks power to prevent its residents
from moving from state to state as they please.278
A key feature of CIANA’s Section 2, however, is that it is limited to state
regulation of minors, for whom the state in general bears special responsibilities.
Further, at stake is minors’ access to abortion, an area where the Court has
particularly emphasized that states have “strong and legitimate interest in the welfare
of [their] young citizens.”279  Even rights enjoying the greatest degree of
constitutional protection ordinarily are not violated by measures that are closely
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tailored to serve compelling government interests.280  Hence, even if Congress’
ability to sanction state regulation of residents’ out-of-state activities is often
constrained by the Fourteenth Amendment, CIANA’s particular extraterritorial
authorization may well fall within congressional power.281  
CONCLUSION
Federalism jurisprudence and scholarship focuses at great length on the scope
of congressional powers.  But the question addressed is overwhelmingly Congress’
power over federal-state relations, whether in the form of direct imposition of duties
on the states or regulation of private conduct that narrows the areas left for state
control.   Far less attention has been paid to congressional authority over interstate
relations, the horizontal dimension of federalism.  This article has attempted to
remedy that gap, taking as its focus Congress’ powers under Article IV, the
constitutional article most devoted to interstate relations and horizontal federalism.
Limning the contours of congressional authority in this context requires a structural
analysis that focuses on the principles lying immanent in our federalist system.  The
conclusion that follows from such an analysis is that Congress enjoys broad power
over interstate relations, including power to contract or expand the requirements of
Article IV.  The one limitation, that Congress lacks power to authorize states to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, on investigation seems not as substantial a
constraint as might initially appear; few of the congressional measures considered
here fall outside of Congress’ powers on this ground.
That Congress has broad power to authorize interstate discrimination does not
mean, of course, that Congress should exercise that power.  Indeed, the relative
infrequency with which Congress has expressly authorized state discrimination is
instructive.   Perhaps Congress has simply not awakened to the scope of its powers
in this area.  Alternatively, perhaps Congress takes seriously—whether due to
political pressure or normative and policy commitments—the constitutional
prohibitions on interstate discrimination, and requires convincing before it will
legislate against them.  While recent evidence suggests that such congressional
opposition to interstate discrimination can dissipate in the heat of disputes over social
values, that is not a reason for denying Congress its constitutional powers.  It is,
instead, a reason to insist that Congress use them wisely and fairly, and to condemn
congressional efforts to sacrifice national union and federalism principles for
political gain.
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